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This thesis contains four chapters that cover topics in macroeconomics and labor, and in theoretical
asset pricing.Chapters one, two and three contain theoretical and quantitative work on macro and
labor. Chapter one, written with Árpád Ábrahám, Ramon Marimon and Lukas Mayr, contains an
evaluation of a policy proposal discussed by European Union policy makers and researchers over
the last decades on the creation of a European Unemployment Insurance System (EUIS). Building
on previous literature, we use a dynamic general equilibrium model to characterize the hetero-
geneous labor markets across EU countries. Our analysis shows that labor markets differ greatly
across EU countries, implying different degrees of exposure of workers to unemployment risk,
and different costs of providing unemployment insurance. With this model, we assess the potential
benefits of a EUIS. We calculate the potential welfare gains from insuring against country-specific
cyclical fluctuations in unemployment expenditures, and from jointly reforming currently national
unemployment benefit systems. The results show that the potential gains from insuring short-term
country-specific fluctuations at the European Union level are small, and that there could be signif-
icant positive improvements in all the countries studied in reforming the existing national unem-
ployment insurance systems to a common EUIS, with country specific contribution rates to prevent
long-term cross-country transfers.
The second chapter studies trends in schooling and lifetime labor supply in the United States.
Life expectancy increased dramatically by almost 20 years for men born between 1850 and 1970
in the US. The allocation of time during the life also changed greatly. Hours worked per week for
the population under 18 years old went from 20 hours to 5 hours on average, during the 1900s.
Almost all the difference is explained by the increase in time spent in school. Later in life, de-
spite the large increase in lifespan and years spent in school, total lifetime hours worked fell. The
average length of retirement period increased fivefold to more than 10 years for the 1970 cohort.
This chapter shows that the long-run trends can be rationalized with a life-cycle human capital
acquisition model, where individuals optimally choose the years of schooling and of labor force
participation. The observed increase in life expectancy alone would imply, according to the model,
an increase in schooling years and in years of participation in the labor market, which is counter-
factual. The analysis shows that in the model, an increase in the returns to schooling, in wages, and
life expectancy, drives individuals’ optimal time allocation decisions as in the data. In the chapter, I
revisit empirical evidence on wages and on the decline in the cost of schooling during the first half
of the 20th century, with the expansion of public provision of secondary education in the United
States.
In the third chapter, in joint work with Julián Díaz-Saavedra and Ramon Marimon, we study how
the introduction of an employment fund can enhance production efficiency and social welfare, and
how it complements, and in part substitutes, the two classical systems of public insurance: pay-as-
you-go pensions and unemployment insurance (UI). The employment fund is akin to the system
introduced in Austria in 2003, that was planned to increase in job mobility and flexibility in the
iv
labor market. We investigate the effects of this "Austrian Backpack" in a dynamic general equi-
librium model with heterogeneous agents calibrated to the Spanish economy in 2014. A backpack
(BP) employment fund is an individual (across jobs) transferable fund, which earns the economy
interest rate as a return and is financed with a small payroll tax (a BP tax). The worker can use
his BP savings if becomes unemployed or retires. The results in this chapter show that to com-
plement the existing Spanish pension and UI systems with a 2% BP tax would be preferred to the
status quo by more than 90% of the households of the calibrated economy; a percentage that can
be higher with a more substantial BP (i.e. higher BP tax). The model presented in this chapter is
a framework where other reforms (e.g. a partial, or complete, substitution of current unsustainable
pension systems) can be quantitatively assessed.
Finally, the fourth chapter contains work developed with Fabian Schuetze about equilibrium
conditions in the canonical Lucas asset pricing model. We provide conditions on investor’s pref-
erences, and the persistence and volatility of the dividend process under which equilibrium in the
economy exists and is unique. The original paper of Lucas shows existence and uniqueness of
equilibrium under the assumption of a bounded utility function. This chapter shows how to extend
the argument in the case of constant relative risk aversion preferences and log-normally distributed
dividends.
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Chapter 1
On the Design of an European Unemployment Insurance
System
This chapter was written with Árpád Ábrahám, Ramon Marimon and Lukas Mayr.
Abstract We assess the benefits of a potential European Unemployment Insurance System (EUIS)
using a multi-country dynamic general equilibrium model with labour market frictions. Our cali-
bration provides a novel diagnosis of the European labour markets, revealing the key parameters –
in particular, job-separation and job-finding rates – that explain their different performance in terms
of unemployment (or employment) and its persistence. We show that there are only small welfare
gains from insuring against country-specific cyclical fluctuations in unemployment expenditures.
However, we find that there are substantial gains from reforming currently suboptimal unemploy-
ment benefit systems. In spite of country differences, it is possible to unanimously agree on an
EUIS with unlimited duration of eligibility, which eliminates the risk of not finding a job before
the receipt of benefits ends, and a low replacement rate of 15%, which stabilizes incentives to work
and save. We argue that such reforms are more effectively designed at the European level than at the
national level because national governments do not take into account general equilibrium effects
of their reforms on citizens in other countries. Concerns regarding the political feasibility of such a
system are addressed through country-specific contribution payments that eliminate cross-country
transfers. The resulting tax differences across countries may be the best statistic of their structural
labour market differences, in terms of job creation and destruction, providing clear incentives for
reform.
1.1 Introduction
The recent financial and sovereign debt crises have affected European labour markets asymmet-
rically both in terms of duration and severity of unemployment. In particular, stressed countries -
such as Greece, Portugal and Spain - have experienced high levels of unemployment, making it
very difficult, if not impossible, to provide adequate insurance for the unemployed and, at the same
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time, to satisfy the low-deficit (Fiscal Compact) commitments. This has raised interest in proposals
for Europe-wide, or Euro-Area-wide, Unemployment Insurance schemes.1
Given the asymmetries and lack of perfect coordination of real business cycles across Euro-
pean countries,2 a European Unemployment Insurance System (EUIS) can efficiently provide risk-
sharing across national labour markets and, at the same time, reduce the countercyclical impact of
unemployment expenditures on national budgets. Furthermore, it can provide three additional im-
portant benefits for the participant states. First, it can reduce the lasting recessionary effects which
follow severe crisis, as it has happened in the euro crisis and recession; second, it can develop a
much needed solidarity across national labour markets and, third, it can improve labour mobility
and market integrations, since unemployment benefits, and the corresponding active policies of
surveillance, do not need to be tied to a specific location.
However, the same asymmetries show that implementing a European Unemployment Insurance
scheme may not be easy - or politically feasible - if it implies large and ‘persistent transfers’ across
countries. In fact, these ‘persistent transfers’ are a good indicator of pending structural reforms;
therefore, it is not just an issue of redistribution, it can also be a moral hazard problem: ‘persistent
transfers’ may further delay costly, but needed, reforms.
Therefore, to assess the need, viability and possible design of an EUIS one needs to take into
account its potential effects: on individual agents’ employment and savings decisions; on the aggre-
gate distribution of employment, unemployment and inactivity; on national budgets, in particular
taxes to finance unemployment benefits; on insurance transfers across countries; on aggregate sav-
ings and investment and, ultimately, on social welfare. In other words, one needs to address these
interrelated effects in order to answer a basic question: which unemployment risks need and should
– and, if so, how they should – be shared across European countries?
This is a conceptual question that requires a quantitative answer. Unfortunately, with the ex-
ception of the works of Dolls et al. (2015) and Beblavy and Maselli (2014), there is very little
quantitative evaluation of European Unemployment Insurance schemes. In particular, there is no
modelling framework to analyse the key trade-offs of such schemes. In this paper we develop and
calibrate – to European countries – a dynamic model to study these effects and provide a set of
policy experiments and an implementable proposal.
Any model requires an adequate level of abstraction, in our case we need to effectively com-
pare labour markets and unemployment policies of different countries. Regarding labour markets,
Figure 1 ranks European countries using Eurostat data on average unemployment rates (and their
variability) for different European countries (2001-2014). This is informative of the ‘European
labour market diversity’ but it is too partial and crude an approximation to build a model just
based on these statistics. Alternatively, a very detailed description of countries’ labour markets
and unemployment policies can be very informative but dilutes the main tradeoffs that should be
at the core of a dynamic equilibrium model. Our approach is to study worker flows across the
three states of employment, unemployment and inactivity. The corresponding transition matrices,
1 In this paper we abstract from specific legal and institutional requirements; we will therefore refer to a European Unemploy-
ment Insurance System (EUIS) in reference to any possible transnational scheme that addresses the type of diversities which
are present in the EU.
2 For an overview on business cycles in the Euro Area see, for example, Böwer and Catherine (2006), Giannone et al. (2009)
and Saiki and Kim (2014).
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Fig. 1.1: Average European Unemployment Rates: 2001-2014
and associated steady-state distributions, are the pictures that describe our different economies.
For example, using Eurostat quarterly data on worker flows (2010Q2-2015Q4), Figure 2 shows
similarities and differences in terms of ‘persistency flows’: Employment to Employment (“E to
E”, denoted E-E) versus Unemployment to Unemployment (“U to U”, denoted U-U). With the ex-
ception of three countries (Spain, Portugal and Slovenia), these ‘persistency flows’ show a strong
correlation among European labour markets, with more important differences on U-U. The cor-
responding ranking, across this E-E vs. U-U axis (of all but three countries), is not the same as
the ranking of unemployment rates of Figure 1. In steady-state, the transition matrix of flows for
a given country defines its stationary distribution of employment, and the corresponding Figures
1 and 2 are just two snapshots of European labour markets. Behind the scattered plots lie possi-
ble differences in preferences, technologies and market institutions, and labour policies. We will
assume that across EU countries citizens share (almost) the same preferences and that labour mo-
bility is relatively low across countries (we assume it is nil) but that EU countries still differ in the
other aspects – mainly, market institutions and labour policies.
We build on the work of Krusell et al. (2011) and Krusell et al. (2017), who calibrate the U.S.
three-states flows with a dynamic general equilibrium model with labour market frictions, to anal-
yse the diverse European labour markets. As in their calibration analysis, we generate worker-flows
transition matrices and distributions across the three states as the outcome of a dynamic general




































Fig. 1.2: Persistence of Employment and Unemployment
equilibrium. This requires us to set a few parameters on preferences and technology, and cali-
brate others to match flows and stocks, consistently with observed time series and the existing
unemployment policies of a country. More specifically, our model economies are characterised by
three sets of parameters: (i) generic parameters of preferences and technologies common to all
economies – agents’ discount factors, idiosyncratic productivity shock, etc.; (ii) country-specific
structural parameters of their economies - for example, the job-separation and job-finding rates,
which in turn are a summary of different factors determining job creation, destruction and match-
ing, and (iii) the country-specific unemployment insurance policies, summarized in two – plus one
– parameters; the two are the replacement ratio (unemployment benefits to wages) and the duration
of unemployment benefits; the third is the unemployment payroll tax rate needed to balance the
budget within a period. Section 2.3 describes our model.
Our calibration is a contribution in itself: it provides a novel diagnosis of the European labour
markets, since it reveals the key parameters that explain their different performance – in terms of
unemployment (or employment) and its persistence. Country-specific structural parameters – in
particular, job-separation and job-finding rates – and not UI policy parameters, are the key param-
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eters. Not surprisingly, the job-finding rates for unemployed and for inactive are aligned, but their
ranking, while very significant to explain persistence, provides a partial picture of labour market
performance: one needs to account for the job-separation rate – for example, the very high job-
separation rate of Spain – to get a more accurate one. In contrast, the ‘technological’ dimension
in which we allow countries to differ – the total factor productivity – is not a key parameter to ac-
count for labour market differences, it mostly accounts for average wage differences. The fact that
differences in UI policy parameters do not correspond to differences in labour market performance
does not mean they are not relevant: they are, for two related reasons. First, because they show
interesting patterns: for example, countries with high unemployment rates –say, Spain, Portugal,
Greece and Slovakia – have low replacement rates but, among them, only those with high job-
separation rates have long average duration of unemployment benefits (Spain and Portugal), while
long average duration of unemployment benefits and high job-separation rates are also character-
istic of countries with low unemployment rates (Denmark and Finland). Second, they are relevant
because different UI policies – and/or different distributions of employment – result in different
payroll taxes, since in our calibration all national budgets balance. These tax differences also de-
termine the desirability of UI policy changes, at the national or at the EU – or some other – level.
It should be noted that our UI policy parameters are related, but not on a one-to-one basis, with
reported replacement and duration rates. We account for the reported eligibility rates, but then we
let the reported benefits and the existing unemployment rates and flows determine our calibrated
UI parameters. Section 1.4 provides a more detailed description of our calibration procedures and
results.
Our model and its calibration provide the framework for our policy experiments, the main goal
and contribution of this paper. Perhaps the most frequently used argument in favor of an EUIS is
that it may provide insurance against country specific large fluctuations in unemployment, which
with limited fiscal capacity result in fluctuations in the tax burden associated with its financing.
Our first experiment therefore targets a quantitative evaluation of the potential pure risk sharing
benefits of an EUIS when one country suffers a severe negative shock. To this end, we compute
the labour market and welfare consequences of a deep recession in two alternative scenarios: (i)
the government is in financial autarky and needs to raise taxes on the employed in order to main-
tain a balanced UB budget; (ii) the country is insured against increased unemployment and can
go through the recession without raising taxes. Otherwise, we assume that the unemployment in-
surance system remains the same in all remaining countries in both cases. We find that the risk
sharing benefits resulting from the welfare differences of the second scenario with respect to the
first one are small, and marginally higher for the employed, whose taxes are smoother, than for the
unemployed, whose benefits have not changed. This experiment implies that although insurance
benefits exist, their small size, questions the rationale for a EUIS as a “rainy day fund”, unless it
rains very often.
In light of this result, one may doubt the desirability of a European unemployment insurance
system. Even more so as the observed heterogeneity in labour market institutions suggests that
the optimal benefit systems could differ substantially across European countries, making it diffi-
cult for governments to reach a common ground. To evaluate this claim, we compute the optimal
unilateral reform of the unemployment benefit system (financed at the national level), separately
for each country. We perform this exercise in partial equilibrium assuming that a single country
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does not affect equilibrium prices. We find that the optimal mix of replacement rate, and duration
of unemployment benefits, is surprisingly similar across the countries studied. In all countries it
is optimal to provide an unlimited duration of eligibility and the optimal replacement rates vary
between 20% and 45%.
Despite similar optimal national unemployment insurance policies one may still argue that the
small difference suffice to let countries reform their systems by themselves rather than to force
them into a common European benefit scheme. We show that this argument is flawed because
individual national governments do not internalize general equilibrium effects of their reforms on
citizens in other European countries. In particular, we show that if all European countries would
reform their system simultaneously and the capital market is required to clear at the union level, i.e.
in general equilibrium, the very same UI benefit systems that seem optimal in partial equilibrium,
are in fact welfare reducing in most of the countries. If national governments are benevolent but
only towards the citizens of their own country, they would reform the benefit system towards a
more generous one than what is optimal from a collective European perspective. Increasing the
generosity of the UI benefit system in some European countries, reduces private savings and hence
the aggregate, European, capital stock. As a consequence the marginal product of labour declines
everywhere. This redistributes from poor agents, who derive most of their income from wages to
rich agents with mainly capital income. Importantly, the common European capital market implies
that this redistribution happens across all Europe.
The final contribution is to provide a better alternative: a common European Unemployment
Insurance System (EUIS). We first show that a fully harmonized system which is jointly financed at
the European level is unlikely to achieve unanimous support across member states as it would result
in transfers from countries with structurally low unemployment to high unemployment countries.
Interestingly, for some of the net payers, the welfare gains of such a reform are positive, suggesting
that in these countries the current unemployment benefit systems are far from optimal. We then
neutralize transfers through varying contribution payments across countries. We find that an EUIS
with an unlimited duration and a replacement rate of 15% is welfare improving in all countries
and almost unanimous. The unlimited duration insures agents against the risk of losing eligibility
before the receipt of unemployment benefits ends. At the same time the low replacement rate
stabilizes incentives to work and save, keeping the European capital stock and therefore wages
high. A positive side effect of such a system with tax differences that eliminate cross-country
transfers is that these differences may serve as an incentive device for individual countries to
structurally reform weak labour market institutions.
Implementation
Although it is not the focus of this paper, it is worth to briefly consider how this EUIS proposal
could be implemented. The basic idea is that it can be implemented through the existing national
Unemployment Insurance Systems, it is for this reason we have only considered the common form
of unemployment benefits defined by their ‘replacement and duration’. If the national funds had
enough borrowing capacity, to provide the unemployment benefits without increasing the taxes
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in times of crisis, and enough commitment, to properly accumulate funds in normal and good
times, the EUIS would only require policy commitment and coordination. However, not all (if
any) existing national systems satisfy these requirements, in which case a mixed solution between
the national UI funds and a central EU fund is in order.
The EUIS central fund can be hosted in the European Stability Fund3 which would have con-
tracts with participating countries stipulating (unemployment) countercyclical transfer between the
national fund and the central fund as to guarantee the uniform unemployment benefits preserving
smooth taxes within the limited borrowing capacity of the national fund. In other words, as with
other ESF contracts, first there must be a country-risk assessment (an improved version of our
calibration) to assess the country referential stable payroll tax rate and unemployment rate, as well
as the thresholds unemployment rates determining country transfers to and from the central fund.
The contract should be designed, as other ESF contracts, to guarantee that these transfers do not
become permanent transfers. In fact, a stable system of payroll taxes and benefits results in fluc-
tuating net revenues at the country level when, in additional to agents’ idiosyncratic risk, there is
also country risk (as in our first experiment in Section 1.5).
The mixed design of the EUIS means that the central fund absorbs these fluctuations beyond
certain limits (given by unemployment rate thresholds), acting as a safe deposit when unemploy-
ment is relatively low and providing insurance when it is relatively high. Our reported structural
differences across countries imply that constrained efficient contracts between participating coun-
tries and the fund should be country specific, but based on the same common principles. On a
periodic basis – say, every seven years – the country risk assessment should be updated and the
referential rates adapted accordingly, to make sure that transfers fulfil their stabilisation role with-
out becoming persistent inflows or outflows, to or from the fund.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses the
current literature on the topic. In section 2.3 we present the model and in section 1.4 our calibration,
which provides the basis for our policy experiments in section 1.5. Finally, section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
There are a few recent papers that also study different aspects of the design of a EUIS coming both
from academic scholars and from policy institutions. In this section, we review briefly some of the
most recent and relevant papers on this issue.
On the hand, Ignaszak et al. (2018) study the optimal provision of unemployment insurance in
a federal state containing atomistic (and symmetric) regions. The focus of their paper is differ-
ent from ours in three important dimensions. First, in their environment, the regions are ex ante
identical, hence they cannot study the asymmetric effect of a EUIS on the different participating
nations as we do. At the same time, their model allows for a rich interaction between federal and
local policies as regional governments have a wide set of instruments, that they can use to respond
to the introduction of new federal policies. Their main focus is indeed to study the crowding out
3 See the ESF ADEMU proposal in Marimon and Cooley (2018, Chs. 2 and 12), based on Ábrahám et al. (2018) characterization
of ESF constrained efficient contracts.
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of regional incentives due to generous federal insurance schemes (moral hazard). The third dif-
ference is that their model does not allow for an intertemporal saving technology for any agents
(households, regions or the union altogether). Our results show that general equilibrium effects of
different unemployment insurance policies through the savings channel can be quantitatively very
important.
On the other hand, Claveres and Clemens (2017) and Moyen et al. (2016)study unemployment
insurance and international risk sharing in a two-region DSGE model with frictional labour mar-
kets and calibrate their model to the core and the periphery of the Euro-zone. In both papers, a
supranational agency runs an unemployment insurance scheme that triggers transfers to recession-
ary countries but has zero transfers in expectation. Such a scheme allows recessionary countries
to maintain unemployment benefits and simultaneously reduce taxes, thus dampening recession-
ary effects. Our model differs in many dimensions from these papers. First, our model features a
higher degree of heterogeneity both across and within countries. In particular, our policy exper-
iments are performed with ten countries of the Euro area instead of two regions. As we show,
labour market institutions and consequently flows across employment, unemployment and inac-
tivity are as heterogeneous across countries within the core (and the periphery) as across the core
and the periphery. For example, we found that certain implementations of an EUIS have signifi-
cantly different effects on Belgium and Germany, two core countries. In addition, the combination
of endogenous savings decisions and idiosyncratic productivity shocks result in a non-degenerate
distribution of wealth in our model. We show that this within country wealth heterogeneity is a key
determinant for both the welfare effects of UI policies and for determining the general equilibrium
channel of policies through precautionary savings. Finally, our paper provides an extensive welfare
evaluation (across countries, employments states and wealth levels) of different EUIS implemen-
tations both with business cycle fluctuations and by studying the transition to a new steady states
after a policy reform.
In contrast with the previous papers, Dolls et al. (2015) and Beblavy and Lenaerts (2017) take
into account the rich heterogeneity within the Euro area. They provide quantitative exercises that
measure the possibilities for intertemporal and interregional smoothing of unemployment benefits
and social security contributions under different versions of a EUIS. Both papers present a set of
counterfactual scenarios where household income and the evolution of labour markets are kept
fixed during the period of study, and different specifications of a EUIS are considered. As in our
paper, both studies find considerable interregional and intertemporal smoothing possibilities. In
contrast with our paper, the lack of individual responses does not allow them to evaluate the effects
of different insurance systems on labour markets, household consumption, individual savings and
welfare. In addition, this implies that there are no equilibrium adjustments either and no effect on
aggregate savings and capital accumulation.
Finally, Dullien et al. (2018) provide a concrete proposal to be discussed at the European Par-
liament following a similar approach as the two papers above. In contrast with our work, they only
focus on the fund-contract aspect, applying the self-insurance and the reinsurance principles to the
design of a EUIS which operates national funds and a joint ‘stormy day fund’ that is operational
only when the country is hit by a severe crisis. Similarly to ours, their scheme is intended to be im-
plemented on a voluntary basis and it has interesting countercyclical features, which can improve
upon the current situation. However, the national contracts are not based on a country-specific
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risk-assessment, the final destination of the funds is not guaranteed and similarly the above papers
the methodology does not allow to evaluate the impact on individual decisions and on equilibrium
outcomes.
1.3 Model
Our model economy consists of a union of I ∈N countries. We assume that the population in each
country i∈ {1, ..., I} is fixed and that there is no migration across countries. This implies that labor
markets clear country by country. Capital, on the other hand, is perfectly mobile across countries.
We assume that the union as a whole is a closed economy such that the (weighted) sum of the
capital stocks in all countries equals the savings of all citizens in the union.
Each country is modeled along the lines of Krusell et al. (2011) and Krusell et al. (2017). Their
model captures key economic decisions of agents regarding their labour market behaviour and
is therefore suited to think about unemployment policy. In particular, in the model, given labour
income taxes and unemployment benefits, agents with an opportunity to work are able to choose
whether or not they work and agents currently not employed are able to choose whether or not to
actively search for a job.
Timing and Preferences.
Time t ∈ {0,1,2, ...} is discrete. Each country is populated by a continuum of agents of measure
ni, where ∑Ni=1 n








log(ct)−αwt − γ ist
]
. (1.1)
Agents derive utility from consumption ct and disutility from employment wt and job search st .
The parameter α captures the disutility of work and is assumed to be the same in each country. The
parameter γ i denotes the disutility of active job search and is varying across countries. In this way
we capture that the governments’ assistance in the search for a job differs across countries. The
time discount factor β ∈ (0,1) is the same for all citizens in the union. Workers can only choose
to supply labor on the extensive margin, i.e. wt ∈ {0,1}. Additionally, the search decision is also
discrete: st ∈ {0,1}.
Markets and Technology.
The production sector is competitive. Firms, who produce according to a constant returns to scale
technology, hire labour from the domestic labour market and pay a wage per efficiency unit of
labour that equals the marginal product of labour. They rent capital from the international capital
market at a price rt and pay for the depreciation of capital; the total rental price equals the marginal
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product of capital, which is the same across countries. Workers supply labour in the domestic
market. This market is characterized by frictions that affect workers’ separations from jobs, and
workers’ access to a job opportunity. In what follows, these frictions are described in detail.
In the beginning of every period, agents who were employed in the previous period can loose
their job with probability σ i. The probability of finding a job while not employed depends on the
search effort. An agent who is actively searching during period t finds an employment opportunity
for period t +1 with probability λ iu; an agent who is not actively searching, with probability λ
i
n <
λ iu. After loosing a job, agents who search may be eligible for unemployment benefits. The process
that determines eligibility for unemployment benefits is described below. Note that the job arrival
rates and the job separation rate are country specific. In this way we capture the heterogeneity in
labour market institutions across Europe.
Agents are heterogeneous with respect to their labour productivity, denoted by zt ∈ Z =
{z̄1, z̄2, ..., z̄nz}. Idiosyncratic productivity follows a first order Markov chain with transition prob-
abilities p(z′|z). This process is assumed to be the same in each country.
Agents cannot directly insure themselves against the idiosyncratic productivity risk, however
they can save using a risk-free bond. The risk-free return is given by the international real interest
rate rt .










where Ait denotes total factor productivity in country i, K
i
t the aggregate capital stock in country i
and θ the capital share of output. Lit is aggregate labour in country i, measured in efficiency units.
In what follows, we generally assume no aggregate (country-specific) shocks, i.e. Ait = A
i.4
Individual Labour Market States.
An agent can be employed, unemployed or inactive. The difference between unemployed and
inactive agents is that the former exert search effort while the latter do not. Further, if an agent
is unemployed he can either be eligible for unemployment benefits, in which case he receives a
certain fraction of his potential income as a wage worker or he can be non-eligible, in which case he
does not receive benefits and hence solely lives from his savings. This gives a total of four possible
individual labor market states that an agent can attain, xt ∈ {e,ue,un,n}: employed, unemployed
eligible, unemployed non-eligible, non-participating;
Unemployment Benefits.
Eligibility for unemployment benefits is partially determined by agent’s endogenous decisions,
partially by exogenous shocks. Only agents who are exogenously separated from their job are
eligible for unemployment benefits, while agents who quit their job themselves are not eligible.
4 We deviate from this assumption only in subsection 1.5.1.
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Further, in order to maintain eligibility agents have to continuously exert search effort. Once an
agent stops searching, she is non-eligible even if at some later time she starts searching again. Fi-
nally, in every period with some probability µ i agents loose eligibility even if they search for a job.
This is a parsimonious way to capture limited (and country-specific) duration of unemployment
benefit receipt.5 Non-eligibility is an absorbing state. The only way to regain eligibility is to find a
job, be employed for some time and then be exogenously separated again.






where b̄it is the replacement rate in country i, ω
i
t is the wage per efficiency unit of labour and zt is
the agent’s current productivity level. The formula in (1.3) implies that an agent receives unem-
ployment benefits according to his current labor market productivity. A more realistic assumption
would be to have unemployment benefits depend on past labour earnings. We choose (1.3) to econ-
omize in the dimension of the state space of the model (avoiding the need to keep track of past
productivity of currently unemployed agents), and because the process zt is persistent, implying
that current productivity is a good proxy for previous labor earnings.
Budget Sets.
In every period t, each agent in country i chooses a pair of consumption and savings from a budget
set Bit(a,z,x) that depends on his current assets, productivity and employment state as well as on




(c,a′) ∈ R2+ : c+a′ ≤ (1+ rt)a+(1− τ it )ω it z
}
. (1.4)
An employed agent finances consumption c and savings a′ with current period’s asset a inclusive
of interest income rta and income from work, net of the tax rate τ it . An unemployed agent who is




(c,a′) ∈ R2+ : c+a′ ≤ (1+ rt)a+bit(z)
}
. (1.5)
He does not have wage income but receives some fraction of his potential income as unemployment
benefits.
Finally, both unemployed non-eligible and non-active agents finance consumption and next pe-
riod’s assets exclusively from savings:
Bit(a,z,u
n) = Bit(a,z,n) =
{
(c,a′) ∈ R2+ : c+a′ ≤ (1+ rt)a
}
. (1.6)
5 In reality this duration is not stochastic but fixed. However, implementing a fixed duration is computationally expensive as it
requires to keep track of the periods that each unemployed agent already receives benefits. To economize on the state space we
hence use this stochastic process as in Krusell et al. (2011) and Krusell et al. (2017).
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Labor Market Decisions and Value Functions.
The individual optimization problem has a recursive representation. Denote the value of an indi-
vidual in country i, period t, and state (a,z,x), by V it (a,z,x). The time index of the value function
captures in a simple way that the current value depends on current and future prices and gov-
ernment policies, which both vary over time. Then the value of an agent in employment is given
by
























The Bellman equation reflects the dynamics of the labour market. In the present period the
worker derives utility from consumption but disutility of work. The continuation value takes into
account that with probability 1−σ i the agent will not be separated from the job. In this case he can
choose between staying employed or to quit the job. In the latter case he can choose to stay inactive
or to search for a new job. He will, however, not be eligible for benefits as he decided to leave
the firm himself. Hence, if the worker does not get separated from his job he has three choices,
x′ ∈ {e,un,n}. With probability σ i the worker is separated from his job. Then with probability
λ iu he immediately gets matched with a new firm, in which case he again can choose between
employment, unemployment and inactivity. If he chooses unemployment he is eligible for benefits
since he was exogenously separated from the job. With probability 1−λ iu he does not immediately
find a new job. In this case he can only choose between eligible unemployment and inactivity, i.e.
x′ ∈ {ue,n}. Note that a worker who was separated from his job will get unemployment benefits
for one period with certainty as long as he searches for a new job during this period.

































In the present period an unemployed agent incurs the utility cost of searching γ i. While searching,
a job offer for next period arrives with probability λ iu, in which case the agent can choose between
employment, unemployment and inactivity. With the remaining probability 1−λ iu the agent does
not receive a new offer and thus can only choose between unemployment and inactivity. Further
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the unemployed looses eligibility for benefits with probability µ i and keeps eligibility with the
remaining probability 1−µ i.
The value of the non-eligible unemployed is very similar. The only exception is that he will not





















Finally, the value for non-active (i.e. not actively searching) agents in country i is given by



















The value of the non-active is similar to the non-eligible unemployed. The difference is that a non-
active does not suffer the disutility of search and has a lower probability of a receiving a job offer
next period, i.e. λ in < λ
i
u.
Definition of Partial and General Equilibrium.
We will now define two equilibria: (i) the partial equilibrium for a specific country i, which takes
the union interest rate rt as given; (ii) the general equilibrium for the union, for which the interest
rate rt is required to adjust such that aggregate savings equal aggregate capital in the union.
Individual state variables are assets a ∈ R+, idiosyncratic productivity z ∈ Z, and employment
status x ∈ {e,ue,un,n}. The aggregate state in country i is described by the joint measure ζ it over
assets, labor productivity status and employment status. Let B(R+) be the Borel σ -algebra of
R+, P(Z) the power set over Z = {z̄1, z̄2, ..., z̄nz} and P(X) the power set over X = {e,ue,un,n}.
Further, let M be the set of all finite measures over the measurable space {(R+×Z×X),B(R+)×
P(Z)×P(X)}.
Definition 1.1. Partial equilibrium in country i: Given sequences of interest rates {rt}∞t=0 and un-
employment benefit policies {(b̄it ,µ it )}∞t=0 and given an initial distribution ζ i0, a partial equilibrium
in country i is defined by a sequence of value functions {V it }∞t=0, consumption and savings deci-
sions {cit ,ait+1}∞t=0, firm production plans {Kit ,Lit}∞t=0, payroll taxes {τ it}∞t=0, wages {ω it}∞t=0 and
measures {ζ it }∞t=1, with ζ it ∈M ∀t, such that:
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(i) Agents optimize: Given prices, unemployment benefit policies and tax rates, the value function
V it and the policy functions for consumption c
i
t and savings a
i
t+1 satisfy the Bellman equations
(2.20), (1.8), (1.9) and (1.10) with equality for each t ≥ 0.




t)−δ and ω it = F iL(Kit ,Lit) for each t ≥ 0.









t (a,z,e)da ∀t ≥ 0 (1.11)
















e)da ∀t ≥ 0 (1.12)




t ) holds for each t ≥ 0: Thereby the function H it : M →M can
be explicitly written as follows:
ζ
i







T it ((a,z,x);A ×Z ×X )ζ it (a,z,x)da,
where T it ((a,z,x);A ×Z ×X ) describes the transition probability of moving from state
(a,z,x) in period t to any state (a′,z′,x′) such that a′ ∈ A ⊂ R+, z′ ∈ Z ⊂ Z, x′ ∈X ⊂ X
in period t +1.6
Definition 1.2. General equilibrium in the union of countries: Given a collection of sequences of
unemployment benefit policies {{(b̄it ,µ it )}∞t=0}Ii=1 and given a collection of initial distributions
{ζ i0}Ii=1, a general equilibrium in the union of countries is defined by sequences of value functions
{{V it }∞t=0}Ii=1, policy functions {{cit ,ait+1}∞t=0}Ii=1, firm production plans {{Lit ,Kit}∞t=0}Ii=1, payroll
taxes {{τ it}∞t=0}Ii=1, wages {{ω it}∞t=0}Ii=1, measures {{ζ it }∞t=1}Ii=1, with ζ it ∈M , and by a sequence
of interest rates {rt}∞t=0 such that all conditions of definition 1.1 are satisfied for each country



















Definition 1.3. Stationary general equilibrium: A stationary general equilibrium is a general equi-
librium in which all government policies, decision rules, value functions, aggregate variables and
prices are constant in all countries of the union.
6 The description of the transition function T it is quite involved and therefore deferred to the appendix.
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1.4 Calibration
We calibrate the model assuming that in t = 0 the union of I countries is in a stationary general
equilibrium (see Definition 1.3 above). Hence, we assume that the Euro-Zone as a whole is a closed
economy with no net capital in- or outflows. However, we want to note here that the structural
calibrated parameters are not sensitive to this choice. In particular, if we do not require capital
market clearing at the union level and consider any world interest rate within a reasonable range
it does not affect the overall calibration much. Currently the countries we consider are the eleven
countries that formed the original Euro-Zone in 1999 plus Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Slovenia and
Slovakia.
The model presented in the previous section has three sets of parameters, which correspond to
the three panels of Table 1.1. The upper panel describes technological and preference parameters
that are common to all countries. In particular, we assume that in all countries the capital share of
production θ , the depreciation of capital δ , the time discount factor β and the utility cost of work α
is the same. Further, we assume that idiosyncratic productivity follows the same Markov process,
for which we use a discretized version of an AR(1) process with persistence ρz and variance σ2z .
Parameter Definition
θ Capital share of output
δ Capital depreciation rate
β Discount factor
ρz Persistence of productivity
σ2z Variance of prod. shock
α Utility cost of labor
Ai Total factor productivity
γ i Utility cost of search
σ i Job separation rate
λ iu Job finding rate for unemployed
λ in Job finding rate for inactive
µ i Prob. of loosing UB eligibility
b̄i UB replacement rate
Table 1.1: Model parameters.
The middle and lower panels display parameters that are specific to each country. The middle
panel includes parameters that capture - in a reduced form - different labour market institutions:
total factor productivity Ai (which affects wage differences across countries), the cost of job search
γ i, the exogenous job separation rate σ i, as well as the job arrival rates λ iu and λ
i
n. The lower panel
contains parameters that define country specific unemployment benefit policies (µ i, b̄i).
In total our model has 6+ I×7 parameters.The three sets of parameters constitute a hierarchical
structure in the degree to which policy can influence them. The unemployment benefit policy
parameters (µ i, b̄i) can be changed relatively easy by governments, while it takes more complex
labour market reforms to change the institutional parameters (Ai,γ i,σ i,λ iu,λ
i
n) and it is very hard,
if not impossible, to change the parameters of the first panel. Given the scope of this paper, in
the policy experiments below we only vary unemployment benefit policies (and how these are
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financed), though we want to explicitly mention here that the institutional parameters are not set
in stone and can be changed through structural labour market reforms.
A central aspect of our analysis are the transitions between employment, unemployment and
inactivity. Flow statistics are a useful measure since they quantify the aggregate transitions be-
tween labour market states in the data. In order to calibrate the model, we therefore use estimated
quarterly transition probabilities, and the corresponding three average labour market stocks, gen-
erously provided by Etienne Lalé. Lalé and Tarasonis (2017) estimate these transition probabilities
using quarterly data on prime-age workers (25-54) in the EU countries, from 2004 until 2013. 7
Data on unemployment benefits in EU Member States is taken from Esser et al. (2013), and data
on population and average labour earnings from Eurostat.
1.4.1 Calibration strategy
We now describe in detail how the model is calibrated. First, we set the technological parameters
θ ,δ ,ρz and σz to the quarterly counterparts of Krusell et al. (2017), who use monthly data for the
US economy to estimate them. We discretize the AR(1) process for individual productivity process
by 5 different productivity states using the Tauchen method. We set the discount factor β to 0.99,
implying a subjective discount rate close to one percent per quarter.
The policy related parameters are chosen as follows. The parameter µ i, which is the conditional
probability of remaining eligible for UB next period, is also the inverse of the average duration of
unemployment benefits in the model. We therefore set 1/µ i to the maximum duration of eligibility
acoording to the law in country i. As described above, we model the eligibility process in this way
because it allows for a simpler representation and a reduction in the dimensionality of the state
space. For the unemployment benefit replacement rates, we set b̄i to the data equivalents in Esser
et al. (2013).
The remaining five country specific parameters Ai, γ i, σ i, λ iu and λ
i
n are calibrated in or-
der to match the following five data moments: the differentials of average wages across coun-
tries,8 the share of unemployed individuals in the population, the employment-to-employment, the
unemployment-to-employment, and the non-active to employment flows. Finally, we set the com-
mon utility cost of work parameter α such that the population-weighted average of the fraction of
employed agents in the Union matches the data.
Table 1.2 lists the common parameters, and table 1.3 contains the country specific parameters
for the calibrated European countries. We also report the tax rates τ i that clear the government
budget in each country.
7 The underlying data is from the EU-SILC dataset, except Germany which comes from the GSOEP.
8 We picked Germany, the largest country in the European Union, as our reference country. So TFP in Germany is equal to one
and for the other countries it is calibrated in order to match wages relative to German wages.
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Parameter Definition Value
θ Cobb-Douglas capital weight 0.3
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.01
ρz Persistence of individual productivity 0.89
σ2z Variance of individual productivity 0.08
α Utility cost of work 0.89
β Discount factor 0.99
Table 1.2: Common Parameters. Time period is 1 quarter; r clears the EU capital market.
Ai γ i σ i λ iu λ
i
n b̄
i 1/µ i τ i(%)
Austria 0.92 0.63 0.04 0.25 0.08 0.28 2.27 0.92
Belgium 1.01 0.60 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.37 19.70 2.13
Germany 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.23 3.94 0.45
Estonia 0.57 0.35 0.03 0.17 0.10 0.46 3.86 2.94
Spain 0.81 0.68 0.06 0.17 0.04 0.33 7.80 4.43
Finland 0.97 0.40 0.05 0.21 0.18 0.36 7.58 3.75
France 0.93 0.30 0.02 0.16 0.06 0.35 7.88 1.90
Greece 0.82 0.90 0.04 0.17 0.03 0.65 3.94 5.60
Ireland 1.05 0.55 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.36 3.94 1.97
Italy 0.92 0.48 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.09 2.58 0.25
Luxembourg 1.15 0.95 0.02 0.17 0.04 0.27 3.94 0.53
Latvia 0.45 0.30 0.04 0.16 0.07 0.57 2.95 1.60
Netherlands 0.87 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.13 0.35 3.50 1.00
Portugal 0.69 0.49 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.36 5.91 4.98
Slovenia 0.77 0.14 0.01 0.14 0.05 0.65 1.97 0.98
Slovakia 0.54 0.25 0.03 0.13 0.07 0.08 1.97 0.16
Table 1.3: Country specific parameters.
1.4.2 Quality of the Fit
In this section we investigate how well the model fits the European labour markets. In the calibra-
tion described above, several labour market moments were targeted. These are shown in Figures
1.3 to 1.6. In Figure 1.3 we observe that the average unemployment rate in Spain, Greece, Latvia
and Portugal is much higher than the European average, while in Austria, Germany, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands it is lower. The persistence of employment (Figure 1.4) is high in almost all
countries. The exceptions are Spain, Finland and Portugal who have substantial flows out of em-
ployment in each quarter. The flows from unemployment to employment (Figure 1.5) are quite het-
erogeneous across European countries. Interestingly, it is lowest in Germany, a country with rather
low structural unemployment. By contrast, Austria, which has similar average unemployment rates
as Germany, has the highest flow from unemployment to employment. We observe substantial het-
erogeneity also in the flows from inactivity to employment (Figure 1.6). For example, in Finland
this flow is much higher than in the other countries.


























































































































































































 E-E flow (target)
Fig. 1.4: Employment-Employment Flows.
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 I-E flow (target)
Fig. 1.6: Inactivity-Employment Flows.
The employment ratios were not targeted country by country, but the union average was. At the
country level, the comparison with the data is shown in Figure 1.7. The model does very well in
replicating the heterogeneity in stocks of employment that we observe in the data.






























































































Given that the model shares of employed and unemployed agents is in line with the data counter-
parts, the model unemployment rate is also as in the data (Figure 1.8). Another important moment
in the model is the average persistence of an unemployment spell in each country, which is not
targeted directly by the calibration. The model predictions is shown in Figure 1.9. By and large the
model performs well also along this dimension, though there are some cases where it underpredicts
(Estonia, Greece, Portugal), and one where it overpredicts (Slovenia) the average duration of an





























































































 Unemployment rate 
Fig. 1.8: Unemployment Rate.




















































































 average duration of Unemployment spell, quarters 
Fig. 1.9: Average Unemployment Duration.
For completeness, the persistence of inactivity is shown in Figure 1.10 below. Again, the model





























































































 I-I flow 
Fig. 1.10: Inactivity to Inactivity Flows.
1.4.3 Diversity of Labour Market Institutions
Our calibration makes apparent that labour market institutions vary substantially across countries.
We visualize this in the Figures 1.11 to 1.13. Figure 1.11 shows the job arrival rate for non-
searchers (λ in, horizontal axis) and searchers (λ
i
u, vertical axis) for each of the calibrated economies.
We observe that these two rates are correlated but their values differ substantially across countries.
For example, in Finland, the Netherlands and Estonia the job finding rate for not actively searching
individuals is higher than 10%, while in Greece, Italy, Spain and Luxembourg it is lower than 5%.
Figure 1.12 plots average the job finding rate for non-employed on the x-axis, but this time
against the job separation rate σ i on the y-axis. It hence gives an idea of the rigidity of the respec-
tive labour markets. Countries in the southeast have the high job finding and low separation rates.
Countries in the northwest corner have high job destruction risk and low chances of finding a job
while not working. Note for instance that while Germany and Spain have similar job finding rates
for the non-employed, job destruciton in Spain in roughly 5 times higher, contributing to higher
unemployment in Spain.
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Finally, Figure 1.13 shows that the countries also differ substantially with respect to their un-
employment benefit system. It plots the replacement rate vs. the average duration for which unem-
ployed are eligible to receive benefits.
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Fig. 1.11: Job Arrival Rates
1.5 Policy Experiments
Based on our calibration, which initializes the economy in t = 0, we are now able to perform sev-
eral experiments and analyze the evolution of countries’ labour markets and other macroeconomic
variables under different configurations of unemployment policy for t ≥ 1. In this part of the anal-
ysis we restrict the set of countries to a number of ten: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland,
France, Ireland, Italy Luxembourg and Netherlands. These countries account for more than 90%
of the Euro-Zone’s total GDP.
As we pointed out earlier, a key motivation for an EUIS would be that it may provide insurance
against country specific fluctuations in unemployment and, in particular, against fluctuations in the
tax burden associated with its financing. In Subsection 1.5.1, we directly study the pure insurance
effects of such policy from the viewpoint of individual European countries. In this experiment,
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Fig. 1.12: Labour Market Rigidity
the EUIM only insures countries against country-specific fluctuations in unemployment, while
keeping the benefit systems at the status quo. We will see that the welfare benefits of such an
insurance system are very small.
As we have seen above, the ten countries are quite heterogeneous in their labour market insti-
tutions, suggesting that the individually optimal benefit systems could vary substantially across
countries. If this was the case and in light of the result that the benefits of insuring against country
specific shocks are small, one may doubt the desirability of a common European unemployment
insurance system. In Subsection 1.5.2, we ask what the countries’ individually optimal benefit
systems are and whether an agreement to a common harmonized European benefit system could
actually be achieved. For this means we compute the optimal unilateral reform separately for each
country (in partial equilibrium). We find that the optimal unemployment benefit systems are sur-
prisingly similar. In all countries it is optimal to provide an unlimited duration of eligibility and
the optimal replacement rates vary between 20% and 45%.
Abstracting from other political constraints, one may argue that these slight differences are
sufficient to implement reforms at the country level rather than at the union level. We show that
such an argumentation is only true if one assumes that the Euro-Zone as a whole is a small open
economy. If, on the other hand, prices are affected by unemployment policy, it neglects spill over
effects across countries. In particular, we show that if all European countries would reform their
system simultaneously and the capital market is required to clear at the union level, i.e. in general
28 1 On the Design of an European Unemployment Insurance System














































Fig. 1.13: National Unemplyoment Benefit Systems.
equilibrium, the very same UI benefit systems that are optimal in partial equilibrium turn out to
be actually welfare worsening in most of the countries. The reason for this result is that increasing
the generosity of the UI benefit system in almost all countries, reduces private savings and hence
the aggregate, European, capital stock. As a consequence the marginal product of labour declines
everywhere. This is bad for poor agents, who, irrespective whether they are currently employed or
not, derive most of their lifetime income from wages.
In reality, the responsiveness of prices to policy changes is likely in between the two extreme
cases we consider - the Euro-Zone as small open vs. a closed economy. The point we want to make
is that if prices are at least to some degree affected by unemployment policy, lack of coordination
across European member states may result in detrimental reforms, thus providing a rationale for
centralizing unemployment policy at the European level. In the last subsection 1.5.3, we therefore
search for a common harmonized European benefit system that is welfare improving in all coun-
tries of the union in general equilibrium. We consider two versions of this experiment that differ in
the way the governments’ budgets clear. First, we consider a fully harmonized system, where the
tax rate in each country is the same and the ten individual government budget constraints (1.12)
are replaced by a single European one. Such a system, by construction, results in transfers from
countries with structurally low unemployment rates to countries with high unemployment and thus
does not achieve unanimous agreement among member states. Interestingly, for some of the net
payers, the welfare gains of such a reform are positive, suggesting that in these countries the cur-
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rent unemployment benefit system is far from optimal. In the second version of this experiment the
tax rates which finance the harmonized system vary across countries such that each government’s
budget constraint (1.12) is satisfied. Such a system eliminates cross-country transfers and we show
that with a replacement rate of 15% all countries are better off than in the status quo.
1.5.1 Insuring Country Level Fluctuations Only
As we mentioned above, the main argument for an EUIM can be that it may provide insurance
against country level fluctuations in unemployment. This insurance might be very valuable as Eu-
ropean countries (especially recently after the crisis) have a hard time to finance the increasing
fiscal burden of unemployment using debt because of tighter deficit requirements. In the following
experiment we provide the “best chance" for these insurance benefits to realise as we assume that
individual countries have no access to any debt or savings to smooth out unemployment fluctua-
tions.
The experiment is constructed as follows. At time t = 0 the country is in its steady state. At the
end of this period, when all decisions are already made, it becomes aware that at t = 1 it is hit
by a completely unanticipated negative shock. After the shock hits the country returns back to its
steady state in a deterministic and gradual way.
Similarly to Krusell et al. (2017), we model shocks as hitting simultaneously TFP (A) and ex-
ogenous labor market flows (σ , λu and λn).9 In particular, a deep recession will be modelled as a
drop in TFP and job arrival rates and a rise in the separation rate. We model economic fluctuations
in this way, because it is well-known that fluctuations of TFP alone are not able to generate large
enough fluctuations of unemployment if output fluctuations are reasonable. This issue is amplified
in our framework by the fact that job creation and job destruction are not modelled endogenously.
Given all these assumptions, note that after the shock is realised the economy is following a
deterministic pattern and eventually converges back to its steady state. Hence, after the realisation
of the shock agents have perfect foresight when solving their dynamic optimisation problems.
We consider two cases: financial autarky and insurance through the EUIS. In financial autarky,
along the transition the tax rate needs to adjust to balance the government budget constraint every
period. In the case of the EUIS, we assume that countries can get full insurance against the rise
in unemployment expenditure and thus can leave the tax rate at its steady state value. We assume
that the shock is a zero probability event and therefore comes at a complete surprise to agents.
This assumption also implies that leaving the tax rate with the EUIS at the steady state value is
actuarially (from an ex-ante perspective) fair.
We want to note here that the zero probability assumption serves one purpose: To calculate
an upper bound for the actual welfare gains that a EUIS would achieve when its sole purpose
was to insurance against country level fluctuations in unemployment expenditures. If we relax this
assumption and assume that the shock happens with some positive probability, an actuarially fair
9 Note that in order to economize on notation we suppressed the time subscript in these parameters in the description of our
model. In most of our analysis these parameters are indeed treated as constant. Only in the present subsection we deviate from
this assumption.
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EUIS would imply a higher tax rate than the steady state tax rate, i.e. countries would have to pay
an insurance premium. This reduces consumption and thus welfare. It also would imply that agents
would prepare themselves for the possibility of such a shock through higher savings, in which case
the smoothing of taxes is less valuable than in case of the fully unanticipated shock.
We calculate the welfare effect of the introduction of this EUIS by comparing the welfare of
autarky and the EUIS of each individual at the end of period t = 0, i.e. after learning that shocks
will occur next period. That we calculate the welfare gains conditional on the negative shock
happening again provides an upper bound for the actual insurance gains.
The argument that we want to make with this exercise is that even in a highly stylized scenario
which in several dimensions is constructed in a way to increase welfare gains of an EUIS relative
to what we would expect in reality, the gains of insuring country level fluctuations are small.









































Fig. 1.14: Shock process in France
The Shocks. The combination of shocks has the following structure. Consider first total factor
productivity in country i. At t = 0 the country is in steady state, i.e. Ai0 = A
i. At t = 1 a negative
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shock of size εA hits,
Ai1 = (1− εA)Ai.
The shock has persistence ρA and moves back to the steady state in a gradual and deterministic
way,
log(Ait) = ρA log(A
i
t−1)+(1−ρA) log(Ai) for t ≥ 1.
Similarly, the job separation rate and the job arrival rates are hit in t = 1,
σ
i









n,1 = (1− ελn)λ
i
n.
After that they gradually return back to their steady state values, i.e. for t ≥ 1
σ
i
t = ρσ σ
i
















We consider a deep recession with TFP dropping by 10% (εA = 0.1), the job separation rate
doubling (εσ = 1), and the job finding rates being reduced by half (ελu = ελn = 0.5). We further
assume that ρA = ρσ = ρλu = ρλn = 0.75. Figure 1.14 depicts the evolution of the shock for the
case of France.
The shock induces changes in labour markets, which are depicted in Figure 1.15. To some extent
these responses are driven directly by the exogenous shock. For example a higher separation rate
reduces employment by construction. But to a substantial degree they result from endogenous
decisions of agents. For example, we observe that unemployment decreases at impact and only
later rises above its steady state value (middle panel) and that at the same time inactivity increases
at impact and gradually decreases later (lower panel). The reason is that because of lower wages
and a lower likelihood to find a job even when searching, many agents are not willing to incur the
utility loss of searching and instead decide not to participate. Only later, when economic conditions
improved, they start searching for a job again. Further, many not separated agents decide to quit
working because of the reduction in wages. In the upper panel we see that already during the first
period (before the shock hits but after agents learned about the coming recession) employment
declines.
If the country is in financial autarky, this mechanism is amplified through a rise in taxes, distort-
ing incentives to (try to) work further. Figure 1.16 shows how taxes in France would evolve under
autarky (solid line) as opposed to the case in which the country is fully insured against fluctuations
in benefit expenditures (dashed line). In France such a shock would result in a gradual increase in
the payroll tax that is from 1.9% to about 3.3% at the peak of the recession.
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Fig. 1.15: Labor Market in France
We performed this very same exercise for all our ten countries. The tax rates in autarky for all
countries are shown in Figure 1.17. We saw before that the steady state taxes which finance the
country specific unemployment benefit systems differ substantially across country. This is a con-
sequence of both different unemployment benefit policies and different labour market institutions
that determine job creation and destruction. As we can see in Figure 1.17 these difference not only
affect the steady state level of taxes but also their responses to shocks.
Table 1.4 shows the welfare gains of insuring against country level fluctuations in taxes. Re-
member that they are computed conditional on the shock happening. One obvious feature of these
results is the very small magnitude of the average welfare gains. This is due to the fact that most
welfare gains come from the small improvement of consumption smoothing for the employed. In
fact, the only reason why also unemployed and non-active have positive welfare gains is because
they may be employed, and thus paying taxes, in the future.
This exercise shows that risk-sharing by itself does not provide a strong rationale for the intro-
duction of an EUIS. In light of this result one may doubt the desirability of a common European
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Fig. 1.16: Taxes in France
unemployment benefit scheme. Especially, since the observed heterogeneity in labour market in-
stitutions (see section 1.4) suggests that the optimal benefit system could differ substantially across
countries, making it difficult to reach a consensus across Europe. In the next section we want to
evaluate this claim and analyze how different optimal benefit systems are across countries.
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Fig. 1.17: Taxes in Autarky
Employed Un. Eligible. Un. Non-Elig. Non-Active Total
Austria 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
Belgium 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.10 0.15
Germany 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
Spain 0.26 0.18 0.20 0.09 0.21
Finland 0.27 0.20 0.27 0.16 0.24
France 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.09
Ireland 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.09
Italy 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Luxembourg 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Netherlands 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04
Table 1.4: Welfare gains (in % CEV) of insuring country level fluctuations
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1.5.2 National Reforms of the Unemployment Benefit System
Before trying to harmonize European unemployment insurance systems, it is worthwhile to com-
pute the optimal unemployment insurance system individually for each country. This gives us an
idea whether the substantial heterogeneity in labour market institutions across Europe actually
allow for such a harmonization or whether they make it impossible to reach a consensus across
Europe. In the following subsection 1.5.2.1 we therefore compute the optimal national unemploy-
ment benefit reforms separately for each country, in partial equilibrium. It turns out that optimal
national benefit systems are similar but not identical. To be specific, all countries find an unlimited
duration of benefit receipt optimal while optimal replacement rates vary between 20% and 45%.
One might think that even if optimal policies are similar, countries are still better off by re-
forming the system to their individual optimum rather than to join a common European scheme.
In subsection 1.5.2.2 we show that in such a scenario it is important to take into account that the
European Union has a common capital market. In particular, we show that sticking to the partial
equilibrium analysis would result in large imbalances between capital and savings across Europe,
unlikely to be sustained in reality. The reason is that the optimal partial equilibrium reforms are
rather generous, resulting in a large decline in precautionary savings. In section 1.5.2.3 we show
that in general equilibrium this would result in a substantial decline in the capital stock. The in-
duced changes in equilibrium prices, in particular a substantial decrease in Europe-wide wages
would render seven out of the ten reforms that seem optimal in partial equilibrium, actually wel-
fare worsening. This suggests that optimal unemployment insurance should be designed at the
broader European level.
1.5.2.1 Optimal Unilateral Reform
In this section we compute the optimal reform for each country separately. For each country i we
ask the question: What is the optimal unilateral once-and-for-all change in (b̄i,µ i) if only country i
was to change its benefit system and the other countries would stick to the status quo? This analysis
is done in partial equilibrium, i.e. we assume that a single country does not affect the equilibrium
interest rate when changing its unemployment benefit policy even thought the savings decisions of
its citizens change. This implies that the marginal product of capital and hence the capital-labour
ratio is pinned down by the interest rate and as a consequence also wages are unaffected by the
change in policy.
We assume that the government maximizes the utilitarian welfare of its citizens. Formally, the




































10 Here we add the policy parameters as arguments in the value function to make it explicit that the values depend on policy
parameters.
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Thereby, individually optimal policies, firm production plans and taxes adjust such that all equilib-
rium conditions in Definition 1.1 are satisfied. Note that for each individual we compute the value
in the initial period and therefore take into account the whole transitional dynamics to the new
steady state.
In order to be able to interpret the welfare gains associated with the policy reform, we translate
them into consumption equivalent variation. In particular, ∆ i(a,z,x) defines the per period percent-
age increase in consumption that you would need to give an individual with initial state (a,z,x)
when the benefit system is kept at the status quo such that he is indifferent between this status quo











Similarly, we define the aggregate welfare gain of the employed, unemployed eligible, unemployed














for x ∈ {e,ue,un,n}.
Table 1.5 shows the current benefit policy and the optimal reform in each country along with
the taxes that finance this policy. For the optimal reform we report the new steady state taxes τ i∞.
Note, however, that along the transition taxes vary in order to clear the government budget period
by period.
We see that despite the substantial heterogeneity in labour market institutions, optimal unem-
ployment benefit policies are surprisingly similar. In particular, in all countries an unlimited du-
ration of eligibility is optimal. This policy eliminates the risk of not finding a job before losing
eligibility. There is some variation in optimal replacement rates but all are in the range of 20 to 45
percent.11 The main difference are the tax rates that finance the rather similar benefit policies.












Austria 2 0.28 0.92 ∞ 0.45 4.61 1.51
Belgium 20 0.37 2.13 ∞ 0.25 1.36 0.16
Germany 4 0.23 0.45 ∞ 0.25 3.15 1.40
Spain 8 0.33 4.43 ∞ 0.45 11.26 2.27
Finland 8 0.36 3.75 ∞ 0.20 0.90 0.33
France 8 0.35 1.90 ∞ 0.35 3.75 1.18
Ireland 4 0.36 1.97 ∞ 0.45 8.37 1.72
Italy 3 0.09 0.25 ∞ 0.45 9.22 3.23
Luxembourg 4 0.27 0.53 ∞ 0.45 3.52 1.07
Netherlands 4 0.35 1.00 ∞ 0.25 4.53 0.89
Table 1.5: Optimal National Reforms of the Benefit System
11 Our optimization routine optimized over increments of 0.05 in the replacement rate dimension.
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For example, there are five countries for which a replacement rate of 45% is optimal. In Ireland,
Italy and Spain the more generous benefit scheme comes along with large increases in the tax rate,
which eventually reach 8.4%, 9.2%, and 11.3%, respectively. In Austria and in Luxembourg, on
the other hand, the same benefit system is optimal but the tax rates only reach values of 4.6% and
3.5%, respectively. The reason for these are the structurally different labour market institutions.
In particular, in section 1.4 we saw that in Spain the job separation rate is much higher, while in
Ireland and Italy the job finding rates are much lower then in the other countries.
The last column shows the aggregate welfare gains. In Belgium this gain is less than 0.2% of
consumption equivalent variation as the current benefit system is not too far from the optimal one.
In particular the duration of eligibility is much higher than in all the other countries. Still there
are some gains from extending the duration to infinity and slightly reducing the replacement rate.
On the other extreme the welfare gains for Italy are large, about 3.2% CEV. According to our
model the current benefit system in Italy with an average duration of eligibility of 3 quarters and a
replacement rate of less than 10% is way too restrictive.
Of course, not every individual in a country benefits from the reform in the same way. Table 1.6
shows the welfare gains at a more dis-aggregated level. We see that in countries where the unem-
ployment system becomes more generous (Austria, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg) the
main beneficiaries are the eligible unemployed as they are the ones who are most directly affected.
However, even if the gains are smaller, also the other agents benefit from the reform as they might
be eligible unemployed in the future.
Employed Un. Eligible. Un. Non-Elig. Non-Active Total
Austria 1.40 3.06 2.62 1.57 1.51
Belgium 0.13 0.28 0.70 0.18 0.16
Germany 1.35 5.20 1.42 1.11 1.40
Spain 2.07 4.16 3.87 1.74 2.27
Finland 0.34 0.14 0.51 0.37 0.33
France 1.11 2.63 1.44 0.84 1.18
Ireland 1.54 4.52 4.37 1.40 1.72
Italy 3.06 9.42 6.15 2.50 3.23
Luxembourg 0.94 4.05 2.56 1.12 1.07
Netherlands 0.85 2.98 0.79 0.71 0.89
Table 1.6: Welfare gains (in % CEV) of individually optimal reforms
Finland has the most restrictive reform. Even if the duration of eligibility is extended, the re-
placement rate is substantially reduced to 20%. As a consequence the eligible unemployed benefit
the least from the reform. The other agents benefit more through the reduction in taxes. This is di-
rectly true for the employed. But also the non-eligible unemployed and the inactive like the reform
more than the eligible unemployed. The reason is that these agents will sooner earn wage income
and pay taxes than they will receive unemployment benefits. Remember that the only way to gain
eligibility for benefits for these agents is by going through employment and being exogenously
separated from the job.
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1.5.2.2 Simultaneous Reforms - The Euro-Zone as a Small Open Economy
Remember that we computed the optimal reform above sequentially, each time from the perspec-
tive of an individual country, which takes interest rates and wages as given. We treated this single
country as a small open economy and assumed that eventual capital in- or outflows resulting from
the reform are absorbed from outside the country.
We now ask the question: What happens if all countries would simultaneously reform their
system to the individually optimal reforms computed above?
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Fig. 1.18: Capital and Savings in the Union under Open Economy Assumption
To answer this question an assumption on how the capital market clears is necessary. An extreme
assumption would be that the Euro-Zone as a whole is a small open economy and therefore prices
would not change even if all countries would change their unemployment benefit systems at the
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same time.12 In such a case the answer is simple: The same set of reforms as the one computed
above (Table 1.5) is optimal and it will result in the same welfare gains (Table 1.6). However, the
reforms would imply large imbalances between total European savings and total European capital.
Figure 1.18 shows that in this scenario private savings decline substantially while the capital stock
actually rises as a result of the reforms. Forty years after the reform about one third of the total
European capital stock is financed from outside the union. The unlimited duration of eligibility
reduces the risk of individuals substantially and therefore leads to a reduction in precautionary
savings. On the other hand, Figure 1.19 shows that the new policies, on aggregate, induce many
inactive agents to start searching. As some of them eventually find jobs also employment and thus
aggregate effective labour increases. As a consequence the marginal product of capital increases
and firms demand more capital.
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Fig. 1.19: Aggregate Labour Market States under Open Economy Assumption
12 Note that in such a case, also at t = 0 the capital market need not clear and one could instead pick another world interest rate.
We experimented with interest rates in a reasonable range and this did not affect optimal policies much.
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1.5.2.3 Simultaneous Reforms - The Euro-Zone as a Closed Economy
While one can challenge the view that the Euro-Zone as a whole is a closed economy, one can
certainly reject the hypothesis that it is too small to have any impact on the interest rate. In partic-
ular, the imbalances in savings and capital which we see in Figure 1.18 are way beyond what we
observe in the data.
Therefore, we now assume that there cannot be imbalances in capital and savings for the union
as a whole. In particular, we solve for the path of interest rates {rt}∞t=1 that clears the capital
market at the union level (condition (1.13)). This change in the interest rates will change optimal
firm production plans and optimal individual behaviour and it will change the equilibrium path of
wages in all countries.
The resulting welfare effects are strikingly different. In Table 1.7 we observe that general equi-
librium effects not only have negative effects in eight countries, in seven out of the ten countries
they even reverse the sign of the welfare gains. Only in Belgium and in Finland agents benefit from
general equilibrium effects. In Luxembourg the gains are still positive but substantially lower than
under the open economy assumption.
Employed Un. Eligible. Un. Non-Elig. Non-Active Total
Austria -0.39 1.12 0.43 -0.21 -0.30
Belgium 1.16 0.96 1.19 1.03 1.12
Germany -0.82 2.72 -1.20 -0.82 -0.77
Spain -0.39 1.43 0.72 -0.36 -0.17
Finland 1.83 1.53 1.96 1.69 1.78
France -0.44 0.98 -0.33 -0.51 -0.37
Ireland -0.31 2.32 1.55 -0.21 -0.12
Italy -0.32 5.05 1.56 -0.32 -0.10
Luxembourg -0.01 2.76 1.08 0.24 0.10
Netherlands -3.09 -1.48 -3.95 -3.15 -3.09
Table 1.7: Welfare gains (in % CEV) of Reforms under Closed Economy Assumption
How can these results be explained? First, note that the aggregate capital stock is now sub-
stantially lower than in the open economy case. Capital is now solely financed by the saving of
Euro-Zone citizens and as mentioned above the reforms on average reduce savings. Figure 1.20
depicts the evolution of capital (savings) when the capital market clears at the union level.
This reduction in the capital stock causes an increase in the marginal product of capital but
reduces the marginal product of labour. As a consequence, interest rates rise but wages decline after
the reform (see Figure 1.21). Note that wages vary across countries but their relative proportions are
unaffected. To be specific, for any pair i, j ∈ {1,2, ..., I} and any t ≥ 0 it holds that wit/w
j
t = Ai/A j.
This implies that wages decline in all countries of the union.
The movements in prices are good for agents who derive most of their net present live time
income from capital but bad for those whose main income source are wages. Welfare gains are
computed in percent of initial consumption implying that if an initially poor and an initially rich
agent experience the same consumption increase in absolute value, the welfare gain for the poor
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Fig. 1.20: Capital and Savings in the Union under Closed Economy Assumption
agent will be higher. Hence, what matters mostly for the aggregate welfare effects are the changes
in the income composition of poor agents. Agents with little assets do not gain much from the
higher interest rate but they lose substantially from lower wages. In the right panel of Figure 1.21
we see that in the long run wages decrease by about 1.5%, the same order of magnitude as the
average decline in welfare through GE effects. It is important to note that by and large all groups
in a country lose or benefit from general equilibrium effects in a similar way (compare Tables
1.6 and 1.7). At first glance this seems surprising since non-eligible unemployed and non-active
agents currently do not have wage income while the other two groups do, the employed directly
and the eligible unemployed indirectly as their unemployment benefits are proportional to wages.
The reason for this result is that mobility across labour market states is higher than across wealth.
For example, a currently poor non-eligible unemployed will sooner be employed and get wage
income than he will be rich enough to derive most of his lifetime income from capital returns.
Now why are there two countries, Belgium and Finland, who benefit from the general equilib-
rium effects? Because these two countries are relatively rich on average and have a relatively equal
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Fig. 1.21: Equilibrium Prices under Closed Economy Assumption
distribution of wealth. This means that the wealth owned by consumption poor agents is higher
than in the other countries and therefore their consumption losses are not big enough to offset the
overall consumption gains.
The general equilibrium feedback effects from prices in turn change the behaviour of agents.
For example, in Figure 1.22 we observe that the decline in inactivity is muted compared to the
open economy case and that employment declines, while before it was increasing. Higher interest
income allows inactive agents to run down their assets at a lower pace and at the same time lower
wages make employment less attractive.
In sum, the results of this section are twofold: (i) According to our model current national un-
employment benefit systems are not optimal and for some countries there is a large potential for
welfare improvement through policy reform; (ii) An integrated European capital market causes un-
employment policies in some European countries to affect the citizens of other European countries
even under the assumption that labor is not mobile. The latter implies that lack of coordination
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Fig. 1.22: Aggregate Labour Market States under Closed Economy Assumption
across member states may result in detrimental reforms and thus provide a rationale to centralize
unemployment policy at the European level. This is the direction we explore next.
1.5.3 Harmonized European Unemployment Insurance Scheme
Can we find a harmonized European unemployment benefit system that is welfare improving in all
countries of the union? We find that the answer to this question depends on how such a system is
financed. If contribution payments vary such that cross-country transfers are eliminated, we find
that a harmonized benefit system with an unlimited duration and a replacement rate of 15% is
welfare improving in all countries. On the other hand, we could not find such a system, when it is
financed jointly at the union level.
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1.5.3.1 Joint Financing on the Union Level
Let us first consider jointly financed benefit systems. In this experiment, we replace individual
countries’ budget constraints with a common European one. Instead of I government budget con-
straints (equation (1.12)) which solve for I different tax rates, there is only one tax rate that clears
























e)da ∀t ≥ 0. (1.14)
Note that both the tax rate and the replacement rate are independent of i. As we mentioned above
not every country would agree to this form of financing no matter what the benefit system is.
In Table 1.8 we show the results for the benefit system with an unlimited duration of eligibility
and a common replacement rate of 15%. We see that while most countries gain from the reform,
there are three exceptions, all of whom are net payers: Austria, France and the Netherlands. Inter-
estingly, not all countries which are net payers lose from the reform. In particular the welfare gains
in Belgium, Germany, Finland and Ireland are positive even though these countries pay substantial
transfers, between 0.14% and 0.87% of their respective GDP. This result is another indicator that
current unemployment benefit policies are far from optimal in some of the countries.












Austria 2 0.28 0.92 ∞ 0.15 1.47 -0.29 -0.51
Belgium 20 0.37 2.13 ∞ 0.15 1.47 0.25 -0.71
Germany 4 0.23 0.45 ∞ 0.15 1.47 0.20 -0.14
Spain 8 0.33 4.43 ∞ 0.15 1.47 1.45 0.74
Finland 8 0.36 3.75 ∞ 0.15 1.47 1.04 -0.87
France 8 0.35 1.90 ∞ 0.15 1.47 -0.06 -0.16
Ireland 4 0.36 1.97 ∞ 0.15 1.47 0.68 -0.09
Italy 3 0.09 0.25 ∞ 0.15 1.47 0.87 0.29
Luxembourg 4 0.27 0.53 ∞ 0.15 1.47 -0.40 -0.64
Netherlands 4 0.35 1.00 ∞ 0.15 1.47 0.17 0.07
Table 1.8: Harmonized Benefit System Financed Jointly
1.5.3.2 Country-Specific Contribution Payments
Let us next consider the case of varying contribution payments across countries, which clear each
country’s government budget constraint separately. To be specific, in this experiment we require
that condition (1.12) holds for each i ∈ {1,2, ..., I}. Table 1.9 shows that in this case the very same
benefit system (unlimited duration, replacement rate of 15%) that we considered above is welfare
improving in all countries of the union.
To understand why this mix of taxes and benefits is welfare improving in all countries it is
worthwhile to remember three findings of our analysis so far: (i) European countries have struc-
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turally different labour market institutions which as a consequence lead to very different long term
averages in employment, unemployment and inactivity (section 1.4); (ii) Despite these differences,
the optimal unilateral reforms are surprisingly similar with an unlimited duration of unemployment
benefits and replacement rates between 20% and 45% (section 1.5.2.1). (iii) If all countries were
to reform their benefit systems by themselves to their respective individual optima this would re-
sult in a substantial decline in the capital stock. As a consequence wages across Europe would be
lower and especially poor agents, who derive most of their lifetime income from labour, would
experience large welfare losses (section 1.5.2.3).












Austria 2 0.28 0.92 ∞ 0.15 0.73 0.23
Belgium 20 0.37 2.13 ∞ 0.15 0.45 0.92
Germany 4 0.23 0.45 ∞ 0.15 1.27 0.38
Spain 8 0.33 4.43 ∞ 0.15 2.53 0.62
Finland 8 0.36 3.75 ∞ 0.15 0.22 2.03
France 8 0.35 1.90 ∞ 0.15 1.23 0.11
Ireland 4 0.36 1.97 ∞ 0.15 1.34 0.79
Italy 3 0.09 0.25 ∞ 0.15 1.90 0.60
Luxembourg 4 0.27 0.53 ∞ 0.15 0.55 0.32
Netherlands 4 0.35 1.00 ∞ 0.15 1.57 0.08
Table 1.9: Optimal Harmonized Benefit System Financed at the Country Level
These three findings help in the design of a collectively optimal unemployment benefit system.
The first finding says that for a system to be politically sustainable we need varying contribu-
tion payments across countries. As we have seen, a common, jointly financed, system would re-
sult in transfers from countries with structurally low unemployment to countries with structurally
high unemployment. The former, at least some of them, would not participate in such a scheme.
We therefore demand from the system that it eliminates cross-country transfers. This is achieved
through varying tax rates that clear government budgets at the national level, i.e. that satisfy con-
dition (1.12). We again observe that in countries with structurally weak labour market institutions
such as Spain or Italy these tax rates are substantially higher than in other countries with more
efficient institutions such as Belgium or Finland.
The second finding suggests that it makes sense to harmonize the benefit system and we indeed
find that an unlimited duration of eligibility and a replacement rate of 15% is welfare improving
in all countries. As before the unlimited duration eliminates the risk of losing eligibility before
finding a job. However, the replacement rate is lower than in any of the unilaterally optimal reforms
computed above, where the minimal replacement rate was the Finnish one with 20%. The third
finding explains why this is the case. We have seen that a too generous benefit system discourages
savings, which in general equilibrium reduces wages, the main income source of poor agents. In
Figure 1.23 we see that in the long-run the capital stock is reduced by only about 2% and 3%,
while before it was between 7% and 8%. As a consequence the effects on prices are muted as can
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be seen in Figure 1.24. In particular, the wage decline is only about half to what we observed in
Figure 1.21.
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Fig. 1.23: Capital and Savings with Harmonized UI Benefit System
Both, less generous unemployment benefits and higher wages, make employment more and
inactivity less attractive and as a consequence aggregate employment is stabilized (Figure 1.25).
As before, the welfare effects are not only heterogeneous across countries but also across differ-
ent groups within each country. This is shown in Table 1.10. We see that while the size varies, the
sign is positive almost everywhere. In fact, only one single group does not benefit from the reform,
the eligible unemployed in Belgium. The reason is that the current benefit system in Belgium has
already a rather high duration of eligibility (20 quarters) and its current replacement rate is much
higher than after the reform (37% vs. 15%). What stands out are the high welfare gains in Finland.
In Table 1.10 we see that the tax rate after the reform is much lower than before. Together with
strong labour market institutions that make the duration of non-employment very short, at least
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Fig. 1.24: Equilibrium Prices with Harmonized UI Benefit System
for people who are willing to work, these tax reductions lead to substantial welfare gains for all
groups.
Employed Un. Eligible. Un. Non-Elig. Non-Active Total
Austria 0.21 0.56 0.47 0.24 0.23
Belgium 1.05 -0.35 0.15 0.81 0.92
Germany 0.34 2.34 0.44 0.28 0.38
Spain 0.65 0.44 0.65 0.58 0.62
Finland 2.09 1.64 1.83 1.90 2.03
France 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.09 0.11
Ireland 0.77 1.07 1.31 0.73 0.79
Italy 0.48 2.73 1.58 0.51 0.60
Luxembourg 0.30 0.85 0.51 0.33 0.32
Netherlands 0.06 0.91 0.13 0.03 0.08
Table 1.10: Welfare gains in (in % CEV) with Harmonized UI Benefit System
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Fig. 1.25: Aggregate Labour Market States with Harmonized UI Benefit System
1.6 Conclusion
This paper is aimed at assessing the value of a European Unemployment Insurance System (EUIS)
and, in particular, how it should be designed as a constrained efficient mechanism. We take as
a constraint the current labour market institutions which determine differences in job destruction
and the likelihood to receive offers by the unemployed (searching for a job) and the inactive (not
actively searching), we also limit the scope of unemployment insurance contracts to contracts de-
fined by their coverage duration and their replacement rate. Our work provides a quantitative proof
of the potential gains that market reforms – not just labour market reforms – can achieve in many
European countries. In fact, the first contribution of this paper is to provide a novel diagnosis of
European labour markets. The second, which is almost a corollary of the first, is to show quantita-
tively that country-specific structural parameters play a determinant role in explaining the different
performance of labour markets across the EU.
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Based on this calibration we perform a set of policy experiments. We show that the gains from
pure risk-sharing (i.e. absent UI reforms) are very limited but that substantial welfare gains can
be achieved by reforming the existing UI systems within European countries. Even if, as we doc-
ument, labour markets are very different, almost surprisingly the (parameterised) UI systems that
maximise welfare are very similar: unemployment benefits duration should be unlimited and re-
placement rates more similar across countries than what they are now. We show that unemployment
benefit reforms in some European countries affect the citizens of other countries through general
equilibrium effects which result from a common capital market. In particular, the decline in precau-
tionary savings associated with more generous unemployment benefit systems causes a reduction
in the aggregate, European, capital stock. This in turn causes a decline in wages all over Europe.
This means that reforms which may seem optimal at the national level can be detrimental at the
European level once general equilibrium effects are taken into account.
Finally, we show that a common, less generous, European benefit system can tackle this prob-
lem. We find that a harmonized benefit system with an unlimited duration and a replacement rate
of 15% is welfare improving in all countries, when it is financed by country specific contribution
payments. The welfare gains are relatively large for all countries, and almost unanimous within
countries, even without accounting for the risk-sharing gains that countries would have if, in ad-
dition to agents’ idiosyncratic risk we also had aggregate country risks. That is, we required that
each country runs a balanced budget, thereby eliminating permanent cross-country transfers. With
country risks and no aggregate European risk, at the steady-state constant – but differential – taxes
would also provide risk-sharing, with short-run cross-country transfers across the EUIS, possibly
with the support of a centralized fund as we discussed in the Introduction. Even with European
aggregate risk the EUIS would play a major stabilising role: taxes would not be constant, unless
the fund has borrowing capacity (which it should), but still provide risk-sharing across countries
and agents. In any case, the resulting tax differences across countries reflect their structural labour
market differences, in terms of job creation and destruction. These tax differences also provide
clear incentives for labour market reforms.
In sum, by increasing welfare across European citizens the proposed EUIS can also be an impor-
tant cohesive EU institution. There is no need to wait for European labour markets to converge to





The transition function T it ((a,z,x);A ×Z ×X ) describes the probability that an agent, who is in
state (a,z,x) in period t, is in any state {(a′,z′,x′) : a′ ∈A ,z′ ∈Z ,x′ ∈X } in period t +1. This
function is quite involved as it captures exogenous shocks and endogenous decisions of the agent.
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Next period’s assets a′(a,z,x) are purely endogenous as they are chosen from the agent in period t
and not subject to any shock. Next period’s productivity level z′ is purely exogenous and depends
on the Markov transition probabilities. Next period’s employment state x′ ∈ {e,ue,un,n} depends
on a combination of exogenous shocks (job separation, job finding) and endogenous decisions
(work, search), which in turn depend on assets and individual productivity.
We can write the transition function as

















′) describes the probability of moving from labor market state x∈{e,ue,un,n}
into employment, conditional on saving ait+1(a,z,x) and on drawing productivity shock z
′. Sim-
ilarly, xue(.) is the conditional probability of moving into unemployment and being eligible for
benefits, and so on.
It is useful to define the decision to search for a job next period, conditional on being not eligible
for unemployment benefits by
st+1(a′,z′,0) =
{






and the decision to search for a job conditional on being eligible for unemployment benefits by
s(t+1a′,z′,1) =
{
















and the decision to work conditional on being eligible for unemployment benefits by
wt+1(a′,z′,1) =
{










′)= (1−σ i)wit+1(ait+1(a,z,e),z′,0)+σ iλ iuwit+1(ait+1(a,z,e),z′,1).
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There are two possibilities how an agent, who is employed in period t, is also employed in t+1:
(i) the agent does not get separated, which happens with probability 1−σ i and does not quit his
job, which is the case if the work decision wit+1(a
i
t+1(a,z,e),z
′,0) = 1. Since job quitters are not
eligible for benefits the last entry of the work decision is zero; (ii) the agent gets separated from
his job (with probability σ i) but immediately finds a new job (with probability λ iu) and decides
to work. In case of exogenous separation the agent would be eligible for unemployment benefits,
therefore the last entry in the work decision is equal to one. One can observe that this conditional
probability is a mixture of exogenous probabilities and endogenous decisions.
Similarly, we can define the other conditional probabilities: The probability of moving from




′)= σ isit+1(ait+1(a,z,e),z′,1)[(1−λ iu)+λ iu(1−wit+1(ait+1(a,z,e),z′,1))].
Eligibility next period requires that the worker is exogenously separated, which happens with
probability σ i and that the agent is actively searching for a job, i.e. sit+1(.) = 1. There are again
two possibilities to be unemployed next period: (i) With probability 1− λ iu the agent does not
immediately find a new job (ii) with probability λ iu the agent immediately finds a new job but he
decides not to accept the offer (wit(.) = 0).
The conditional probability of moving from employment into unemployment and being eligible
for benefits is equal to the probability of not being separated (once you are separated you are
automatically eligible for benefits), given that the agent decides to quit w(.) = 0 and to search for




















The agent can become inactive either if he does not get exogenously separated but decides to quit
working and searching (fist line) or if he gets separated and does not search for a new job (second
line).
We now described all possibly cases for an agent who is employed in period t, i.e. xt = e. In an
analogous way this can be done for all other initial labor market states, i.e. for xt ∈ {ue,un,n}.
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Chapter 2
Schooling and Lifetime Labor Supply
Abstract This paper presents an empirical and theoretical investigation of the trends in schooling
and lifetime labor supply during the 20th century in the United States. It shows that a life-cycle
human capital model, where individuals optimally choose both the years of schooling and of labor
force participation, is consistent with the long-run trends. The observed increase in life expectancy
alone would imply, according to the model, an increase in schooling years and in years of partici-
pation in the labor market, a counterfactual result. The analysis shows that an increase in schooling
time and a decline in lifetime labor supply is explained by an increase in life expectancy, returns
to schooling and wages. I revisit evidence on decline in the cost of schooling during the first half
of the 1900s, with the expansion of public provision of secondary education in the United States.
2.1 Introduction
The 20th century saw major demographic and economic developments in the most advanced
economies. In the United States, life expectancy at age 5 climbed from 52.5 years for men born
in 1850 to 70.7 years for men born in 1970. The allocation of time during the life-cycle displayed
major changes too. From 1900 to 2000, market work in the population group under 18 years old
steadily declined from 20 average working hours per week to below 5 hours, in per capita terms.
Almost all the difference is compensated by the increase in time spent in school, that increased
sharply during the first half of the 20th century. In 1900, the population group over 65 years old
worked on average 20 hours per week. One hundred years later, the same group devotes less than
5 hours per week to market work, and dedicates instead most of the difference to leisure activi-
ties (Ramey and Francis (2009)). Interestingly, in the prime-age period (25-54 years old group),
weekly hours of work per capita were remarkably stable from 1900 to the 2000s.1 Figures 2.1 to
2.3 show data on market work, schooling and leisure of different age groups in the US since 1900
until 2005, measured in hours per capita.2 Figure 2.2 illustrates the dramatic increase in time spent
1 The period of the Great Depression and the second World War show exceptional swings.
2 Data for the period 1900 to 1958 is covered in Kendrick (1961) and Kendrick (1973), and from 1958 to 2005 in Ramey and
Francis (2009). The dataset for the entire period is available at the Ramey and Francis (2009) AEA website.
53
54 2 Schooling and Lifetime Labor Supply
in school at ages younger than 18, that offsets hours of work in this age group. Goldin and Katz
(1999) calculates that around 70% of the increase in years of the education in the US population
between 1900 and 1970 was due to high school graduation. I provide further data on the 1900s
US ‘high school movement’ below. These large shifts motivated a long research literature, and re-
cent papers study the consequences of the demographic evolution for economic growth and public
policy programs (e.g. Cooley and Henriksen (2018) and Scheiner (2018)). In figure 2.3, data on
leisure consumption explains how most of the decline in hours of work in the 65+ age group was
compensated. Costa (1998) provides an overview of the trends in retirement during this period.
Fig. 2.1: Average weekly hours of market work per capita for different age groups.
In this paper, I show that a model of human capital investment, as in Ben-Porath (1967), enriched
such that the decision problem about the allocation of time considers schooling, labor supply and a
retirement period, provides a rational for the data trends described above. In particular, the model
shows that when individuals optimally decide jointly on how long to go to school and how long
to participate in the labor market, an increase in life expectancy, in the return to schooling and in
wages implies longer time in school, a decline in lifetime labor supply, and a longer retirement
period, as in the data. In contrast, a longer life horizon alone increases both schooling years and
market participation - a counterfactual result. Previous literature identifies the increase in life ex-
pectancy as the driving force behind the observed changes in schooling years and lifetime labor
supply (see Cervellati and Sunde (2013)). Finally, I review the evidence on the sharp decline in
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Fig. 2.2: Average weekly hours of market work and school per capita for young 14-17 years old.
the cost of schooling in the beginning of the 1900s, after the expansion of public expenditures on
primary and secondary education in the United States, which together with increase in real wages
during the same period, is consistent with the proposed mechanism.
2.2 Empirical Evidence and Related Literature
This section presents the empirical evidence that is addressed in the theoretical and quantitative
section below, and discusses related literature. Figure 2.4 shows total lifetime hours of work and
years of schooling for cohorts of men born in the decades from 1850 to 1970 in the US.
Figure 2.4 replicates one of the contributions of Moshe (2009) and is at the center of the dis-
cussion of subsequent literature. It shows a continuous decline in total hours of labor supply and a
clear increase, since the 1880 cohort, in schooling years of the subsequent cohorts. The evolution
of total lifetime hours of work, seen in figure 2.4, is affected by changes in average hours condi-
tional on working (intensive margin), and changes in the number of years of market participation
(extensive margin). The trends in figure 2.1 show stable hours per capita in the prime-age group
and declining hours in the 65+ group, suggesting an important role of changes in the participa-
tion rates at older ages. Using cohort estimates, Moshe (2009) shows that participation declines
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Fig. 2.3: Average weekly hours of market work and leisure time per capita for 65+ years old.
after age 65, smoothly in the 1840 cohort estimate (around 50% participation at age 75) but more
sharply the older the cohort (below 20% at age 75, for the 1930 cohort). Looking specifically at
the retirement period, Lee (2001) provides estimates of average duration of the retirement period
enjoyed by the subsequent cohorts. These estimates, plotted in figure 2.5, help dissect the long-run
(cross-sectional) changes in labor supply per capita shown in figure 2.1.3 By subtracting to the
evolution of life expectancy (black dots in figure 2.6), years of schooling and length of the retire-
ment period, I obtain a measure of the evolution of average years of labor force participation (grey
dots), shown in figure 2.6.
To summarize, these figures provide the cohort-based estimates that correspond to the long-run
trends displayed in figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. They show that over time, total lifetime labor supply
declined due to increases in time dedicated to formal education at younger ages, and to increases
in the length of the retirement period dedicated to leisure consumption. During this period, life
expectancy increased sharply by more than 10 years.
Previous literature has studied the evolution of life expectancy, schooling and lifetime labor
supply discussed above. Moshe (2009) documents the relationship between schooling years and
total hours of work, shown in figure 2.4 above, and argues that the predictions of the canonical
Ben-Porath (1967) model of lifetime human capital investment and labor supply are at odds with
3 Lee (2001) provides cohort estimates and period estimates of the expected length of the retirement period at age 20. Figure
2.5 shows the average of the two estimates, which is used throughout the paper as the average length of the retirement period.
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Fig. 2.4: Expected total working hours over lifetime at age 5, for different cohorts of men (left
axis); and schooling years (right axis). This figure replicates Fig. 10 in Moshe (2009).
this evidence. According to the ‘Ben-Porath mechanism’, an increase in life expectancy implies an
increase in school time if and only if total lifetime hours of labor supply increase. Since the latter
is not observed in the data, life expectancy alone cannot drive the changes in schooling and labor
supply choices. Cervellati and Sunde (2013) further investigates the mechanism by exploring the
role of changes in the age profile of survival rates during the period. The paper identifies a set of
theoretical assumptions that are necessary for the Moshe (2009) ‘if and only if’ condition to hold,
among these the assumption of a rectangular survival function.4 This assumption, albeit counter-
factual, is important in the analysis. Cervellati and Sunde (2013) shows that in the Ben-Porath
model, the benefits of schooling may increase following an increase in the survival probability at
working ages, even if life expectancy does not change. Interestingly, the survival rate for prime age
individuals increased significantly in the older cohorts. In Cervellati and Sunde (2013) it is shown
that the standard model, calibrated with realistic age profiles of survival probabilities, is consistent
with an increase in schooling and a decline in total lifetime hours of labor supply, i.e. with figure
2.4.
4 A survival function gives the survival probability at each age. A rectangular shaped survival function implies a probability one
of surviving up to a certain age (usually set to the average life expectancy), and zero after that. The other assumptions behind
the Moshe (2009) condition are:
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Fig. 2.5: Estimates of school years is from Moshe (2009). Retirement years are the mid-range
values of the upper and lower bound estimates in Lee (2001).
As documented above, the decline in lifetime labor supply since 1900 is not given by a uniform
decline of hours worked over the life-cycle. Hours worked per capita are stable in the prime-age
group, and decline in younger and older age groups. With a longer life span, schooling years almost
double and the average duration of the retirement period increased more than fivefold between
1850 and 1970, as shown in figure 2.5. The ‘Ben-Porath mechanism’ discussed in Moshe (2009)
and Cervellati and Sunde (2013) is not tested against these observations. Moshe (2009) identifies
the puzzle in figure 2.4, which is about total hours of lifetime labor supply. Cervellati and Sunde
(2013) shows that the Ben-Porath mechanism is consistent with the decline in total hours of labor
supply. Given that the Ben-Porath (1967) model is a life-cycle model about the timing of human
capital investment and labor supply, the question about whether the theory is consistent with the
trends in schooling, labor supply and retirement - figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 - remains without an
answer.
In this paper, I tackle this question by considering a life-cycle Ben-Porath model that includes
a joint decision on schooling, labor supply and retirement period. In contrast to Moshe (2009) and
Cervellati and Sunde (2013), where the decision about retirement is absent, in the model presented
below agents optimally decide jointly on how long to stay in school and how long to participate
in the labor market. The model can then speak to figures 2.5 and 2.6. When doing so, I revisit the
role of changes in life expectancy, returns to school and wages on the observed long-run trends.
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Fig. 2.6: Using the estimates of life expectancy at age 20 (black dots) and length of retirement
in Lee (2001), and school years from Moshe (2009), I calculate years of labor force participation
(grey dots).
The following section introduces the model. In addition to the human capital investment deci-
sion of the standard Ben-Porath (1967) theory, individuals decide on the optimal duration of their
career in the labor market.5 Next, I solve the model and evaluate it quantitatively by comparing
it to the data discussed above.. The paper concludes with a review of empirical evidence on the
sharp decline in the cost of schooling and rise in labor productivity during the 1900s in the United
States.
2.3 Model
The model described below is designed to capture the individual problem of optimizing the al-
location of time during the life-cycle. During his lifetime, an individual derives utility from the
consumption of goods and leisure. Apart from leisure consumption, the agent can use his time
endowment to invest in human capital and to provide labor services. Higher human capital means
5 Shin et al. (2012) uses a model that includes an individual life-cycle problem with a schooling and retirement decision, as the
model used here, to study the role of taxes and retirement policies in explaining US-Europe differences in lifetime labor supply.
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higher productivity in the labor market and higher wage income, but requires diverting time from
the labor market to school. Higher lifetime income allows for higher consumption of goods and
leisure. Because human capital depreciates with time, human capital investment is optimally car-
ried out more intensively at the beginning of life, while leisure consumption is instead backloaded.
I compare the predictions of the model after an increase in life duration, the wage rate and the re-
turn to human capital investment, represented by an increase in the productivity of human capital
production, and compare them with the data shown in the previous section.
2.3.1 Preferences and Technology
Age is continuous and represented by a ∈ [0,T ]. An individual maximizes discounted lifetime
utility from consumption of goods c(a) and leisure l(a):∫ T
0
e−ρaU(c(a), l(a))da; (2.1)
ρ is a discount factor. At each age, he is endowed with one unit of time that can be allocated to
human capital investment x(a), to labor supply n(a), or to leisure consumption l(a):
x(a)+n(a)+ l(a) = 1 (2.2)
I assume that human capital investment and labor supply are decided along the intensive margin,
n(a),x(a) ∈ [0,1], while leisure is consumed at the extensive margin, l(a) ∈ {0,1}. An interpreta-
tion of this assumption is provided at the end of this section.
Human capital depreciates at a rate δ and, given an initial level h(0), evolves over time according
to:
ḣ(a) = f (z,h(a),x(a))−δh(a). (2.3)
z is a productivity parameter. Below, I assume that f is a strictly increasing and concave function
of the time spent in school. A linear production function is one of the assumptions used in Moshe
(2009) that Cervellati and Sunde (2013) shows need to be imposed to derive the necessary condi-
tions in Moshe (2009). The agent can borrow and lend at the interest rate r, and can not die with
debt: b(T )≥ 0. His flow budget constraint is:
ḃ(a)+ c(a) = y(a)+ rb(a). (2.4)
y(a) is labor market income. It is determined by the wage rate w and labor supply in efficiency
units, h(a)n(a): y(a) = wh(a)n(a). The agent starts life with an initial asset holding b(0).
In the following, I describe the solution to the problem of maximizing 2.1 subject to 2.2, 2.3
and 2.4, given an initial endowment h(0) and b(0). Since human capital takes time to accumulate,
the solution displays higher human capital investment at earlier ages and leisure consumption at
older ages. We can interpret x(a) = 1 as the schooling period and the leisure choice as a retirement
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decision. The analysis below focuses on how changes in the life horizon, T , wages w and the return
to human capital investment, parametrized by z, affect the allocation of time over the life-cycle.
2.3.2 Solution
To simplify the analysis, and because my focus is on the time allocation decision, I assume ρ =
r = 0. Furthermore, I assume that preferences are described by a separable utility function, so that
the marginal utility of consumption is constant at all ages:
U(c, l) = u(c)+ v(l), (2.5)
u is a strictly increasing and concave function, with limc→0 u1(c) = ∞, and v (which is evaluated at
l = 0 and l = 1 only) taken on non-negative values. The separability assumption, together with free
borrowing and lending and no discounting, imply that the consumption of goods is constant over
the life-cycle.6 The discrete leisure decision amounts to the choice of the share of the total lifetime
endowment of time dedicated to leisure consumption.7 This formulation allows to clearly study
how changes in life expectancy, technology and prices impact the optimal decision of schooling
time and labor force participation, and compare the model predictions with the data presented
above.
The problem can be studied in two steps. First, for a given retirement age R, the human capital
investment and labor supply decisions solve a lifetime income maximization problem. Second,
given the optimal labor and human capital investment policies conditional on R, I solve for the
optimal goods and leisure consumption decisions that pin down R.
2.3.2.1 Income maximization problem
Given a retirement age R < T , l(a) = 0 from a = 0 to R, and l(a) = 1 for a ∈ [R,T ]. The objective







ḣ(a) = f (z,h(a),x(a))−δh(a), (2.7)
given h(0). Here I am using the condition x(a)+ n(a) = 1 to eliminate n(a). I assume that gross
human capital production is given by:
f (z,h(a),x(a)) = z(h(a)x(a))γ , γ ∈ (0,1),z > 0. (2.8)
6 This simplification is in line with Moshe (2009) and Cervellati and Sunde (2013).
7 A general proof of the property of the solution according to which leisure is backloaded and consumed continuously from a
certain age R until T can be found in Shin et al. (2012). In the present environment, with no time discounting and zero interest
rate, a sufficient condition is that human capital depreciates, δ > 0.
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Empirical estimates indicate decreasing to constant returns to schooling.
At an interior choice of n(a), and denoting by q(a) the co-state variable, the solution is described
by:
wh(a) = q(a)γzh(a)(h(a)x(a))γ−1, (2.9)
q̇(a) =−w(1− x(a))−q(a)[γzx(a)(h(a)x(a))γ−1−δ ], (2.10)
with q(R) = 0. Rearranging and substituting out wn(a), one obtains the law of motion of q(a):
q̇(a) =−w+δq(a). (2.11)











The shadow price of human capital increases with the wage rate w and decreases with depreciation
δ , and decays with age a until R. At age R, human capital has no value since the agent will not
supply labor services from then until T . Having solved for q(a), one can solve explicitly for the









Note that, for given R, the wage rate w does not influence human capital investment. The reason
is that, at the margin, an increase in w increases the return on human capital by as much as the
increase the opportunity cost of not working. In contrast, changes in z influence investment in
human capital and, as shown below, labor supply and hence leisure consumption. Given 2.8 and








1− γ −δh(a). (2.14)
With an initial stock of h(0), at age a the human capital stock is












1− γ dt. (2.15)
As seen before, conditional on R, changes in the wage rate per efficiency unit have no effect on
the stock of human capital, whereas increases in the productivity level z increase human capital at
all ages. For an arbitrary choice R, conditions 2.13 and 2.15 further allow to evaluate the impact
of changes in z on the human capital investment decision. Using 2.15 to eliminate h(a) from 2.13


















The expression above shows that, for a fixed R (so that the effective discount factor on human
capital m(a) does not change) an increase in z leads to an increase in the allocation of time to
human capital formation, x(a), at all ages a ∈ [0,R). The conditions describing the solution of the
human capital investment problem when the constraint x(a) ≤ 1 is binding are slightly different
and are derived in the Appendix. The analysis above continues to hold. Below I interpret the period
a ∈ [0,s] when x(a) = 1 as the schooling period, s.
I now turn to the optimal timing of leisure consumption, R−T , and how it reacts to changes in
T , wages and productivity. To study these interactions I consider the second step of the solution
procedure.
2.3.2.2 Goods and leisure consumption
The second step amounts to finding the optimal level of consumption, c̄, and fraction of time
allocated to leisure consumption, T −R. For that purpose, it is useful to rewrite the problem by













= Tu(c̄)+(T −R)χ (2.17)
To ease notation, I normalized v(0) = 0 and v(1) = χ . Lifetime resources are given by lifetime






For each age a, conditions 2.13 and 2.15 are functions of R only, through the discounting function
m(a) = 1− e−δ (R−a), (2.19)
which allows to replace h(a) and h(a)n(a) in 2.18 and write an expression for lifetime resources
as a function of R alone plus initial assets b(0). I denote lifetime labor market income by W (R),





8 W (R) depends on h(0).
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subject to the lifetime budget constraint:
T c̄≤W (R). (2.22)
With Φ denoting the multiplier on constraint 2.22, the first order conditions are:
u1(c)−Φ = 0, (2.23)
−χ +ΦWR(R) = 0, (2.24)
where u1 is the first derivative of u and WR represents the first derivative of W with respect to R.
Assuming 2.22 holds at equality, jointly these imply:
χ = u1(W (R)/T )WR(R). (2.25)
The condition above has a clear interpretation. At the optimal leisure choice, the marginal util-
ity gain of an increase in leisure consumption (T −R) is balanced with the marginal increase in
lifetime income WR, priced by average lifetime consumption W (R)/T . The derivative of lifetime









































The first term is the marginal increase in income at the retirement age, R. The second term captures
the increase of the human capital life-cycle profile due to a marginal increase in R. We saw above
that, according to expression 2.15, increasing R raises human capital at all ages. The last term,
which contributes negatively, summarizes the additional cost of human capital formation through
the increase in human capital investment.
In the following two sections, I calibrate the model presented above and replicate the quanti-
tative exercise in section 4 of Cervellati and Sunde (2013). In the quantitative exercise, I ask the
model what are the effects of an increase in life expectancy T , wages w and returns of schooling z
on schooling time and lifetime labor supply. I compare these effects with the estimated changes in
time allocation choices during the 1900s.
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2.3.3 Numerical solution
The model has 7 parameters: T , z, γ , δ , w, θ , χ . To specify their values, I take two cohorts of men
born in 1880 and in 1930 in the United states, and use the corresponding estimated average life
expectancy, schooling years and length of retirement period. In figure 2.6 above, life expectancy
for cohort 1880 is 65.6 and for cohort 1930 is 73 years.9 From figure 2.5, I take the average years
of schooling for men born in 1880 and for men born in 1930, and the Lee (2001) estimates of the
expected length of the retirement period. I use these estimates to first calibrate the model to the
1880 cohort and then evaluate the model predictions about the observed relative changes schooling
and labor supply of the 1930 cohort. Table 2.1 summarizes.
1880 1930
life expectancy 65.6 73.0
years of schooling 8.2 13.3
length of retirement period 2.9 7.2
years on the market 54.5 52.5
Table 2.1: Data: the last row is given by the first row minus the second and the third rows.
Accordingly, I set T = 65.6 for the 1880 cohort, normalize w = 1, and choose z and χ to match
the average years of schooling (8.2) and on the labor market (54.5) given in table 2.1. For the
remaining parameters that govern the human capital production technology, γ and δ , I take the two
values used in Shin et al. (2012).10 Finally, I use the utility function 2.27 with θ = 2.0, which is





T δ γ z θ χ
65.6 0.024 0.68 .052 2.0 1.6
Table 2.2: Calibration to 1880 cohort.
Table 2.2 shows the implied model for the 1880 cohort, which I label M1880:
9 I choose the 1880 and 1930 cohorts to directly compare the results to the ones in Cervellati and Sunde (2013), which uses the
same decades. High child mortality rates imply life expectancy at age 5 quite low, so I use age 20 instead.
10 Shin et al. (2012) targets more recent data on the age profile of wages to discipline the human capital production technology.
So far I couldn’t find estimates of the age profile of labor earnings for the early 1900s period, so I stick to the values γ and δ
from that paper.
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Data M1880
life expectancy 65.6 65.6
years of schooling 8.2 8.4
years on the market 54.5 54.6
Table 2.3: Model of the 1880 cohort.
2.3.4 Quantitative exercise
The following table presents the main results of the paper. I perform the following experiment:
Relative to the 1880 cohort, I compute the impact of increasing life expectancy (T ) and returns to
schooling (z, w) on schooling years and lifetime labor supply. Recall that in the quantitive exercise
in Cervellati and Sunde (2013), the evolution of life expectancy explains the observed changes in
schooling and total hours worked. The question is whether in a human capital investment model in
which schooling time and retirement are optimally chosen, the same holds relative to the data in
figures 2.5 and 2.6.
For better readability, I introduce the following notation. M1930(T,z,w) denotes model predic-
tions for the 1930 cohort, for given life expectancy T , productivity of human capital technology z
and wage rate w confronting individuals born in 1930. z̄ = .052 and w̄ = 1 are the parameter values
corresponding to the 1880 cohort, as in table 2.2. The third column in table 2.4 shows the model
predictions when z and w are fixed at the 1880 levels, and life expectancy increases to T = 73
years. The fourth column, in addition to an increase in life expectancy to 73 years, shows the
model predictions after a 10% increase in z = 1.1∗ z̄ and w = 1.1∗ w̄, relative to the 1880 cohort.11
1880 1930 M1930(73.0, z̄, w̄) M1930(73.0,1.1∗ z̄,1.1∗ w̄)
life expectancy 65.6 73.0 73.0 73.0
years of schooling 8.2 13.3 12.7 14.7
years on the market 54.5 52.5 58.1 51.7
Table 2.4: The exercise shows the effect of increasing life expectancy between 1880 and 1930 on
schooling and labor supply.
The exercise shows that the 7 year increase in life expectancy has a large impact both on school-
ing and on labor force participation. Years of schooling increase 5.1 years between the 1880 cohort
and the 1930 cohort; and 4.5 according to model in the third column of the 1930 cohort. Years on
the market decline in the data, from 54.5 to 52.5. In contrast, the model predicts an expansion of
labor force participation to 58.1 years after the increase in life expectancy. This is consistent with
the theoretical tradeoff described in the previous section: an increase in life expectancy increases
11 A 10% increase is likely to be a conservative assumption on the increase in wages and school returns over the 1880-1930
period. See the discussion at the end of this section.
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the value of labor force participation the retirement age, delaying retirement (recall Figure 2.7).
Longer time working raises the incentive to acquire human capital in school, which increases the
schooling period. Accordingly, the combined change in the schooling period and leisure consump-
tion at older ages is such that lifetime labor supply increases almost 4 years. Relative to the data
in figure 2.6, the model predicts - with increasing life expectancy alone - that the theoretical coun-
terparts of the grey dots in the figure would be trending upward, instead of declining as in the
data. As a consequence, the implied length of the retirement period in the third column (73.0-12.7-
58.1=2.2 years in the model vs 7.3 in the data) declines relative to the 1880 cohort (2.9 years),
which is counterfactual given the positive trend in figure 2.5.
The second step of the exercise, under the fourth column in table 2.4, shows the effect of in-
creasing T , w and z on schooling and labor force participation. As previewed before, under the
baseline calibration of the human capital production technology and with θ = 2.0, increasing z
leads to an increase in the schooling period and an increase in leisure consumption, implying a de-
crease in lifetime labor force participation to 51.7 (which compares with 52.5 in the data). School
increases by more 1.4 years according to the model, relative to the data on the 1930 cohort. For a
given retirement choice R, an increase in the wage rate w has no impact on the schooling period
and hence on human capital h(R). Both wh(R) and W (R) increase in proportion to the increase in
w. With θ > 1, the curve in Figure 2.7 shifts left and the retirement age decreases. The two effects
jointly imply more time in school and less time on the market. Despite over predicting the joint
effect of increases in life expectancy and in the returns to school on schooling time by 1.4 years,
the predicts a decline in lifetime labor supply, in line with the data. To conclude, the joint effect of
life expectancy and increasing returns to school return is consistent with the data trends in figures
2.5 and 2.6.
I now provide some motivation for the increase in the returns to schooling, represented by
increase in z above. Evidence on the sharp decline in the cost of schooling during the first half of
the 1900s abounds. Goldin and Katz (1999) documents the US ‘high school movement’ between
1910 and 1940. About 70 percent of the observed increase in years of education of adults in the
US between 1900 and 1970 was due solely to high school attendance. During this period, state and
local (public) expenditures in elementary and secondary tripled from about 1% to 3% of regional
income (Fig. 1, Goldin and Katz (1999)). In 1970, the national level was 4.5 percent, with more
than half of the total increase between 1910 and 1925. Rangazas (2002) estimates that real spending
per pupil in primary and secondary public education increases by a factor of 4 between 1880 and
1940, implying an increase from 1.0% to 2.4% of GDP over the same period. The long-run annual
average of aggregate productivity growth was 1.6% from 1870 to 1972. As a result of the increase
in years of schooling, Rangazas (2002) estimates that worker productivity rose 1.7 to 2 times from
1870 to 1970.
2.4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I revisit the long-run trends about the evolution of the years of schooling, lifetime
labor supply and retirement in the 20th century in the US. I document that hours worked per capita
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Fig. 2.7: This figure ilustrates equation 2.25. Horizontal axis: age, with T = 1. Vertical axis: left and
right hand sides of equation 2.25. The intersection between the two lines determines the solution
R.
declines sharply at younger and older ages, an remain stable during the prime-age period. Younger
people spend much more time obtaining formal education, and older people enjoy leisure time in
much longer periods of retirement after leaving the labor force. In the second part of the paper,
I show that the standard Ben-Porath (1967) life-cycle model of human capital and labor supply,
extended as to include both an optimal choice of the school period and length of labor force par-
ticipation, is consistent with the stylized facts. I investigate the role of increasing life expectancy,
the decline of the cost of schooling through the expansion of public provision of schools in the US
during the first half of the 1900s, and improvements in productivity. The results are consistent with
the empirical evidence presented in Moshe (2009) that stresses the importance of an increase in
the returns to schooling in explaining the observed patterns of time allocation. To fully address the
evidence on the evolution of the age-profile of survival rates and its consequences for optimal time
allocation decisions in Cervellati and Sunde (2013), further research should include survival risk in
the stylized model presented above. As noted before, the fact that survival probabilities increased
the most for the age group of 65+ years, raises a quantitative question regarding the overall effect
of increasing survival rates on labor supply among the 65+ age group as well as on total lifetime
labor supply. I am working on the answer to that question, that will be included in a future version
of this paper.
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Appendix
This section describes the evolution of human capital h(a) when early life includes a schooling






ḣ(a) = z(h(a)x(a))γ −δh(a) [q(a)] (2.29)
h(a)(1− x(a))≥ 0 [λ (a)] (2.30)
First order conditions:





−λ (a)(1− x(a)) (2.32)
λ (a)h(a)(1− x(a)) = 0 (2.33)
In the schooling period n(a) = 1 and λ (a)≥ 0. The conditions simplify to:






λ (a)≥ 0 (2.36)
Together these imply
q̇(a) = δq(a)−w−λ (a) (2.37)
From the law of motion of capital, when x(a) = 1:
ḣ(a) = zh(a)γ −δh(a) (2.38)
Using 2.34 and the equation above, we obtain













= (1− γ)δ (2.40)
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Chapter 3
Introducing an Austrian Backpack in Spain
This chapter was written with Julián Díaz-Saavedra and Ramon Marimon.
Abstract In an overlapping generations economy with incomplete insurance markets, the intro-
duction of an employment fund – akin to the one introduced in Austria in 2003, also known as
‘Austrian backpack’– can enhance production efficiency and social welfare, if it complements, and
in part substitutes, the two classical systems of public insurance: pay-as-you-go pensions and un-
employment insurance (UI). We show this in a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model with
heterogeneous agents of the Spanish economy (2014). A ‘backpack’ (BP) employment fund is an
individual (across jobs) transferable fund, which earns the economy interest rate as a return and
is financed with a small payroll tax (a BP tax). The worker can use the fund if he or she becomes
unemployed or retires. To complement the existing Spanish pension and UI systems with a 2%
BP tax would be preferred to the status quo by more than 90% of the households of the calibrated
economy, a percentage that can be higher with a more substantial BP (i.e. higher BP tax). Our
model also provides a framework where other reforms – e.g. a partial, or complete, substitution of
current unsustainable pension systems – can be quantitatively assessed.
3.1 Introduction
The reform of existing public insurance systems is an ongoing issue which the last euro crisis and
recession has only exacerbated, and which has been the focus of extensive research in economics
and other social sciences. Most of this research has focused on the possible reform of separate
specific systems: either the pay-as-you-go pension system or the unemployment insurance system
(UI), but not on their interaction. However, there is an interesting reform that, in our opinion,
deserves further analysis: this is the introduction of an employment fund, akin to the one introduced
in Austria in 2003 – also known as the ‘Austrian backpack’. This is the enquiry that we start in
this paper: the effect of introducing such a fund to complement and partially, or even completely,
substitute existing public insurance systems.
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The basic features of a ‘backpack’ (BP) employment fund are: it is a fund own by the employee
which accumulates, with a basic payroll (BP) tax, while working; it is transferable across jobs and
can be finally used as a pension fund; usually it earns a market interest rate (i.e. it can be privately
managed), but there may be restrictions in its use (e.g. additional individual contributions may be
restricted and the worker may only be able to use it if he or she is unemployed, inactive or retired).
While different forms of private employment funds are not a novelty in some countries – Austria
being the leading example and it is has been proposed in Spain – such funds are not common
as part of the public insurance policy. One example of a private funding scheme is the TIAA-
CREF (Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund), which is
a non-profit employment fund founded by Andrew Carnegie in 1918 and nowadays serving over
5 million active and retired employees; it has played, and plays, an important role in enhancing
mobility among university professors across US universities. However, it is a retirement fund not
designed to provide unemployment insurance, while the ‘backpack’ provides both forms of in-
surance. Obviously, privately saved assets can also play this double role. However, there are two
features that distinguish the ‘backpack’ : first, and foremost, its character of ‘forced savings’, and,
second, possibly a favourable tax treatment (both are common features of fully-funded pension
systems). Our benchmark ‘backpack’ does not allow additional private contributions, the worker
can only draw from it if not employed, and its returns are taxed (as any capital gains) but backpack
assets are not taxed as part of the income.
The ‘Austrian backpack’ was introduced in 2003 as part of a broader labour reform. In partic-
ular, it was the socially agreed exchange for the elimination of the existing system of severance
payments and, in fact, the ‘backpack tax’ of 1.5% was set according to this tradeoff. Kettemann et
al. (2017) have shown (with a structurally estimated search-and-matching model) that this reform
spiked job-creation and lowered unemployment. Nevertheless, the main effect of the reform came
from the elimination of severance payments. We are interested in analysing the effect of just intro-
ducing the ‘backpack’ , therefore we do not pair its introduction to another labour reform. To our
best knowledge, this analysis is missing and it is the focus of this paper.
As mentioned, there is a wide related literature on the reform of public insurance systems; nev-
ertheless our work builds directly on, and integrates, two models: the model of Díaz-Giménez and
Díaz-Saavedra (2009) and Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra (2017), developed to study pension
system reforms in Spain using overlapping generations general equilibrium models, and the model
with job creation and destruction with search frictions and three employment states (employed,
unemployed and inactive) of Krusell et al. (2011), further developed in Ábrahám et al. (2018) to
study unemployment insurance reforms in Europe. The latter shows that there is ample room to
improve existing European UI systems even within the limits of their current design in which un-
employment benefits (UB) are determined by their duration and the replacement rate. In particular,
unlimited UB duration emerges as a welfare-improving feature when agents have limited insurance
possibilities. In sum, in our model economy agents – which we refer to as households – can differ
by their age, education, and productivity, and they decide how much to save and consume, as well
as their employment status, which also depends on the rates of job creation and destruction – i.e.
agents can also differ by their assets and employment status and are subject to idiosyncratic risks.
In our benchmark economy, households can insure against their idiosyncratic risks privately,
through their savings, but there is also public unemployment insurance and a pay-as-you go pen-
sion system, both financed with payroll taxes. An aggregate production function and a government
that must balance the budget close the model. The model is calibrated to the Spanish economy (in
2014) with the distinct – welfare improving – feature of having unlimited unemployment benefits1.
We introduce a ‘backpack’ , similar to the one introduced in Austria, with a 2% ‘backpack tax’ ,
and compute the new steady state. Even if it is a relatively small backpack, the effects within the
economy are relatively large in terms of macroeconomic aggregates (higher capital and output)
and prices (lower interest rates and higher wages), as well as in terms of households’ decisions
underlying the macroeconomic effects (substitution of private for backpack savings) and as a result
of these effects (high productivity agents work more). Overall the economy is more productive and
agents benefit from higher consumption. The final result is that there are substantial welfare gains,
in terms of consumption-equivalent values and, importantly, of support for the change when agents
are asked whether they would prefer to be in an economy with the ‘backpack’ . The fact that, at
this stage, we only ‘add the backpack’ makes the comparison of steady states more meaningful
since we do not violate any existing claims that retirees or unemployed may have on the current
public insurance system. We also show that a ‘bigger backpack’ , can provide even higher welfare
gains.
The next section presents our model economy, Section 3 its calibration and Section 4 the re-
sults.
3.2 The Model Economy
In this section we introduce the baseline model economy. We study an overlapping generations
model economy with heterogeneous households, a representative firm, and a government. The
model economy is an enhancement of framework in Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra (2009),
with job creation and destruction and dynamic work and search decisions as in Ábrahám et al.
(2018).
3.2.1 The Households
Households in our baseline economy are heterogeneous and differ in their age, j ∈ J; in their
education, h ∈ H; in their temporary productivity level z ∈Z ; in their employment status, l ∈L ,
and in their assets, a ∈ A; Sets J, H, Z , L , and A, are all finite sets and we use µ j,h,z,l,a to denote
the measure of households of type ( j,h,z, l,a). They also differ in their claims to different social
insurance systems: unemployment benefits ub∈UB and retirement pensions p∈ P. In Section 3.4,
we introduce an employment fund (the Austrian backpack) as yet another social insurance policy.
In this section we describe the model that will be matched with the Spanish economy in 2014 and
we do not make reference to the backpack system. We think of a household in our model as a
1 This distinct feature also helps to reduce the number of states since our detailed heterogenous agents structure already results
in 6,804,000 agent types!
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single individual, even though we use the two terms interchangeably. To calibrate the model, we
use individual data of persons older than 20 in the Spanish economy.
Age. Individuals enter the economy at age 20, the duration of their lifetimes is random, and they
exit the economy at age 100 at the latest. Therefore J = {20,21, ...,100}. The parameter ψ j denotes
the conditional probability of survival from age j to age j+1. The notation makes explicit that the
probabilities depend on age j, but not on education or other factors.
Fertility and immigration. In our model there is no demographic change and, therefore, economy
fertility rates and immigration flows are not accounted for.
Education. Households can either be high school dropouts with h = 1, high school graduates who
have not completed college h = 2, or college graduates denoted h = 3. Therefore H = {1,2,3}. A
household’s education level is exogenous and determined forever at the age of 20.
Labor market productivity. Individuals receive an endowment of efficiency labor units every pe-
riod. This endowment has two components: a deterministic component, denoted εh, j and a stochas-
tic component, denoted by z. The deterministic component depends on the household’s age and
education, and we use it to characterize the life-cycle profiles of earnings. The stochastic compo-
nent is independently and identically distributed across the households, and we use it to generate
earnings and wealth inequality within the age cohorts. This component does not depend on the age
or the education of the households, and we assume that it follows a first order, finite state, Markov







zt+1 = z′|zt = z
}
, with z,z′ ∈ Z. (3.1)
Every period, agents who have not retired yet receive a new realization of z. Accordingly, the
labor productivity is given by εh, jz. An individual may or may not have a job opportunity in any
given period. If he does and decides to work, he works for a given number of hours denoted e j,
that depend on age.2 His gross labor earnings during that period, y, are given by εh, jz times the
economy-wide wage rate w:
y = ωεh, jze j. (3.2)
Labor market status. In the model economy, an agent is either employed, unemployed, non-active
or retired. Every individual enters the economy with a job opportunity. An individual with a job
at hand in the beginning of the period, who decides to work, is employed in that period and his
labor market status is denoted by l = e. An agent without a job or who decides not to work, can
search for a new job for the next period - becoming unemployed -, or choose not to search and
remain non-active in that period. An unemployed household who is eligible for unemployment
benefits is labeled ue, and if he is not eligible labeled l = un. An agent not working and also
not actively searching for a job, who has not retired yet, is non-active and denoted with l = n.
The eligibility criteria is defined below. Every worker faces a positive probability of becoming
jobless next period, and every jobless agent (who has not retired) receives a job offer with some
probability. The probability of receiving a job offer is higher for job-searchers than for non-active
agents. Once a household has reached the early retirement age, it decides whether to retire. The
retirement decision is irreversible and there is no mandatory retirement age.
2 All the details on the calibration of the process εh, j and e j are provided in Section 3.3
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Workers. A worker provides labor services and receives a compensation that depends on his effi-
ciency labor units. Workers face a probability of loosing their job at the end of the period, denoted
σ j. This probability is age dependent, and we use it to generate the observed labor market flows
between employment and non-employment states within age cohorts. With probability 1−σ j, the
worker keeps his job, draws a productivity according to Γ , and decides whether to continue work-
ing or to quit.
Unemployed. Unemployed agents who lost a job at the end of the previous period and exercise a
search effort are entitled to collect unemployment benefits determined by the function b, specified
below. At the end of each unemployment period, an unemployed receives a job offer with prob-
ability λ uj . This probability is again age dependent, and we use it to generate the observed labor
market flows between unemployment and employment.
Non-Active. Agents that are without a job and do not actively search for a new one are labeled
non-active. Those agents are not eligible for unemployment benefits, and receive a job offer for
next period with a lower probability than an unemployed agent, λ nj < λ
u
j . This probability is also
age dependent, and we use it to generate the observed labor market flows between non-activity and
employment.
Retirees. Households who are R0 years old or older and have a job decide whether to to retire and
collect the retirement pension. They take this decision after observing their current labor produc-
tivity. If they decide to retire, they loose the endowment of labor efficiency units for ever and exit
the labor market.
Insurance Markets. An important feature of the model is that there are no insurance markets for
the stochastic component of the endowment shock nor for unemployment risk. We model different
public insurance systems that help agents in the economy to smooth consumption in face of these
shocks.
Assets. Households in our model economy differ in their asset holdings, which are constrained to
being non-negative. The absence of insurance markets give the households a precautionary motive
to save. They do so by accumulating real assets which take the form of productive capital, denoted
a ∈ A. For computational reasons below we restrict A to be a discrete set A = {a1,a2, ...,an}.
Unemployment Benefits. Eligibility for unemployment benefits is conditional on having lost a job
at some point in the past and not having started a new job yet, and on continuously searching for a
job. Eligibility does not expire as long as this condition is met, and non-eligibility is an absorbing
state. Eligible agents receive unemployment benefits given ub = b0ȳ, where b0 is a replacement
rate and ȳ is the average labor earnings in the economy. Unemployment benefits are financed with
payroll taxes, described below.
Pensions. Pension payments differ for each educational group,
ph = pbȳh, (3.3)
where ȳh is the average earnings of households in educational group h during the last Nb years
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where ȳ jh is the average gross labor earnings of workers aged j and with education h. Finally,
in this model we assume that there are no early retirement penalties, nor minimum or maximum
pensions. Pension payments are financed with payroll taxes.
Other transfers. In addition to the social insurance systems described before, households receive a
small transfer from the government, denoted tr.
Preferences. Households derive utility from consumption and leisure, and disutility from search
effort. Given our assumption of a discrete choice of work and search, the period utility is described
by a utility flow from consumption and the utility cost of time allocated to market work and to
job search. Non-active and retired agents dedicate all the time endowment to leisure consumption.













where β is a time discount factor, c is consumption and σ the curvature parameter, α and γ are
respectively the work and job search utility costs. ψ j is the survival probability, and ψ19 = 1. w
equals 1 in periods of work and is zero otherwise, and similarly for the search decision s.
3.2.2 The Firm
In our model economy there is a representative firm. Aggregate output depends on aggregate cap-
ital, K, and on the aggregate labor input, L, through a constant returns to scale, Cobb-Douglas,
aggregate production function of the form
Y = Kθ (AL)1−θ (3.6)
where A denotes an exogenous labor-augmenting productivity factor. Factor and product markets
are perfectly competitive and the capital stock depreciates geometrically at a constant rate, δ .
3.2.3 The Government
The government taxes capital income, household income and consumption, and it confiscates un-
intentional bequests. It uses its revenues to finance an exogenous flow of public consumption, and
to make transfers to households other than pensions. In addition, the government runs a pay-as-
you-go pension system and provides unemployment benefits. The consolidated government and
pension system budget constraint is then:
G+P+U +Tr = Tk +Tp +Ty +Tc +E (3.7)
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where G denotes government consumption, P denotes total pension payments, U denotes unem-
ployment benefits, Tr denotes government transfers other than pensions, Tk, Tp, Ty, and Tc, denote
the revenues collected by the capital income tax, the payroll tax, the household income tax, and
the consumption tax, and E denotes unintentional bequests.
Capital income taxes. Capital income taxes are given by τkyk, where τk is the tax rate on gross
capital income yk.
Payroll taxes. Payroll taxes are proportional to before-tax labor earnings: τpy.
Consumption taxes. Similarly, consumption taxes are simply τcc, where τc is the consumption tax
rate and c is consumption.
Household income taxes. In this model, we assume a simplified income tax formula according to
which the income tax is proportional to the income level: τyyb, where τy is a tax rate parameter
and yb is the tax base. The income tax base depends on the employment status. If a household is
employed,
yb = (1− τp)y+ r(1− τk)a+ tr. (3.8)
For the unemployed and non-active agents,
yb = r(1− τk)a+ tr, (3.9)
and for a retired household:
yb = r(1− τk)a+ tr + p. (3.10)
In these expressions, p is the retirement pension, that depends on h as explained before.
3.2.4 The Backpack System
Our baseline model, calibrated to the Spanish economy in 2014, does not feature the employment
fund that we denote by Backpack system. Hence, even though to simplify the model description we
omit the backpack system in the next section, we explain it here to fix ideas. It is at the center of our
analysis in the policy experiments discussed in Section 3.4. The backpack system is a fully-funded
social security program, similar to the system introduced in Austria in 2003. Every individual
starts without backpack claims. For every period of employment, a worker sees a small portion τb
(around 1.5% in Austria) of his labor income deducted and invested into a personal employment-
linked savings account, which is remunerated at the market rate of return, r. If bt is the level of
backpack assets at the beginning of an employment period, then next period’s backpack evolves
according to:
bt+1 = τbyt +(1+ r(1− τk))bt , (3.11)
When a worker looses his job, his backpack assets are added to his private savings that he can
use to finance consumption (present or future, as he can choose to save the backpack assets). In
contrast, if a worker chooses to quit his job while still in the labor force, he keeps the backpack but
cannot withdraw. In that period, the backpack evolves according to
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bt+1 = (1+ r(1− τk))bt . (3.12)
Upon retirement, backpack assets are added to private savings and households can use them as
they please. The aggregate amount of backpack assets is invested in the capital market and adds to
the supply of productive capital in the economy.
3.2.5 The Households’ Decision Problem
The households’ problem is described recursively. To simplify the exposition, we describe first the
consumption and savings decision facing each household after his labor market decision has been
taken. Given the value of having a job opportunity or being jobless, the optimal consumption and
savings decisions determine the value of working, searching, inactivity, and retirement. With those
values, we in turn describe the optimal labor market decisions.
We start with individuals that are younger than the minimum retirement age, specifically j < R0.
In this way we can abstract, for now, from the retirement decision. An individual of age j and
education level h, private savings a, stochastic productivity z, and is currently employed (w), faces
the following optimization problem:













subject to the budget constraint Beh given by
Beh(a,z) =
{




with y = ωεh, jze j and yb = (1− τp)y+ r(1− τk)a+ tr.
Equation (3.13) above reads in the following way: the first two terms inside the curly brackets
reflect the flow utility from consumption and the utility cost of work, α . The continuation value,
discounted by β times the probability of survival until age j+1, given by ψ j, reflects all the pos-
sible continuation histories of the realization of the stochastic component z′ ∈Z , and two distinct
labor market outcomes. With probability 1−σ j, the worker keeps the job in the next period, which
has a value Jh, j+1 that also depends on next period’s assets a′ and the new realization of idiosyn-
cratic productivity z′. With probability σ j, the worker looses his job and starts next period jobless,
with value Lh, j+1. This value depends on whether the household is eligible for unemployment
compensation. After a period of work and a separation shock, the agent is eligible and hence the
last argument of L equals 1, denoting eligibility for unemployment benefits (0 denotes not eligible,
below). Savings a′ are optimally chosen today and z′ follows the Markov chain described in (3.1).
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A household currently unemployed and eligible for unemployment benefits solves the following
problem:























where yb = r(1− τk)a+ tr (also in (3.18), (3.20) and (3.25) below). Similarly, an unemployed
household who is not eligible for benefits solves













+(1−λ uj )Lh, j+1(a′,z′,0)
]}
, (3.17)
with the important difference that in this case there are no unemployment benefits:
Buh(a,z,0) =
{
(c,a′) : c,a′ ≥ 0, and (1+ τc)c+a′+ τyyb ≤ (1+ r(1− τk))a+ tr
}
. (3.18)
Note that eligibility for unemployment benefits is represented by the last argument in the value
functions U and L, and the expression for the budget constraint of the unemployed: 1 means the
agent is eligible for benefits, a 0 means he is not. An agent who is currently unemployed, eligible
for benefits, and does not find a job for next period will continue to be eligible (and will collect
unemployment benefits if he decides to continue searching for a job). In contrast, an agent who
is currently non-eligible (because he quit the job or because we was not eligible last period) will
continue to be non-eligible next period. Finally, households may decide to stay out of the labor
market, by not working and not actively searching for a job. The problem is:













+(1−λ nj )Lh, j+1(a′,z′,0)
]}
, (3.19)
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For non-active households, the flow utility comes only from consumption, and the job arrival rates
are lower than for the unemployed and given by λ nj . As in the previous case, consumption and
investment are supported solely by past savings and government transfers:
Bnh(a) =
{
(c,a′) : c,a′ ≥ 0, and (1+ τc)c+a′+ τyyb ≤ (1+ r(1− τk))a+ tr
}
. (3.20)
To close the description of the household’s problem when j < R0, the values of having a job or
being jobless at the beginning of a period pin down the work and search decicions:






Lh, j(a,z,1) = max
s∈{0,1}
{
sUh, j(a,z,1)+(1− s)Nh, j(a,z)
}
, (3.22)
Lh, j(a,z,0) = max
s∈{0,1}
{
sUh, j(a,z,0)+(1− s)Nh, j(a,z)
}
. (3.23)
We consider now the the problem of the retiree and the retirement decision. Retired individuals
are not in the labor market and have no endowment of efficiency units of labor. They finance
consumption with past private savings, pension payments (and with backpack savings if there is a
backpack system). The problem is a standard consumption-savings decision, with survival risk and
a certain maximum attainable age, assumed to be j = 100. At age j = 99, the continuation value is
zero because the agent exist the economy next period with probability one. Before that, the retired
household solves:











(c,a′) : c,a′ ≥ 0, and (1+ τc)c+a′+ τyyb ≤ (1+ r(1− τk))a+ ph + tr
}
. (3.25)
The problem depends on state a and on h, the education level, because the pension payments
depend on h: ph. From the first retirement age R0 on, an employed household compares the value
of retirement Vrh, j with the value of working one additional period, depending on his current
labor market productivity. In addition to his current endowment of efficiency units, the decision
depends on his savings and on his education level that, as we have assumed, determines is pension
payments. The retirement decision is given by:
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3.2.6 Steady-state dynamics
The steady-state dynamics of the economies under study have the following characterisation. Given
a distribution of households entering the economy ( j = 20 and a = 0; say, at T ) they all receive a
job opportunity and make their consumption, asset and employment decisions. These households’
decisions together with their survival probabilities define the distribution of this cohort the follow-
ing year (T +1) at j = 21, but it also the distribution of households of j = 21 at T . Similarly, for
j = 22, ...,100; that is, the different cohorts coexisting at T mirror the evolution of the distribution
of households entering the economy at T up to the end of their potential survival j = 100. In other
words, the decisions that agents of generation T make through their live are already made in the
year they enter the labour market by older agents if they have the same state. By construction, this
is a steady-state distribution, which is our benchmark distribution. Different economies simply ex-
pose the T cohort distribution to different public insurance systems and, therefore, all the cohorts
coexisting at T behave as if the given system was in place when they entered the economy.
3.2.7 Definition of Stationary Equilibrium
Let j ∈ J, h ∈H, z ∈Z , l ∈L , and a ∈ A, and let µ j,h,z,l,a be a probability measure defined
on ℜ = J×H ×Z ×L ×A.3 Then, a stationary competitive equilibrium for this economy is a
government policy, {G,P,Tr,U,Tk,Ts,Ty,Tc,E}, a household policy, {c( j,h,z, l,a), w( j,h,z, l,a),
s( j,h,z, l,a), r( j,h,a,z), a
′
( j,h,z, l,a)}, a measure, µ , factor prices, {r,ω}, macroeconomic ag-
gregates, {C,Y ,K,L}, and a function, Q, such that:
(i) The government policy satisfy the consolidated government described in Expression (3.7).
(ii) Firms behave as competitive maximizers. That is, their decisions imply that factor prices are
factor marginal productivities r = f1 (K,AL)−δ and ω = f2 (K,AL).
(iii) Given the government policy, and factor prices, the household policy solves the households’
decision problem defined in Expressions (3.13), through (3.26).
(iv) The stock of capital, consumption, the aggregate labor input, pension payments, unemploy-
ment benefit payments, lump-sum transfers, tax revenues, and accidental bequests are obtained
aggregating over the model economy households as follows:
3 For convenience, whenever we integrate the measure of households over some dimension, we drop the corresponding sub-
script.




































where all the integrals are defined over the state space ℜ.




′− (1−δ )a)dµ +G = F(K,AL). (3.27)





Describing function Q formally is complicated because it specifies the transitions of the measure
of households along its five dimensions: age, education level, productivity, employment status,
and assets holdings. An informal description of this function is the following: We assume that
new-entrants, who are 20 years old, enter the economy with a job opportunity, that they draw the
stochastic component of their endowment of efficiency labor units from its invariant distribution,
and that they own zero assets. Their educational shares are exogenous. The evolution of µ jh is
exogenous, it replicates the the distribution by age and education of the Spanish population in
our calibration target year, 2014. The evolution of µz is governed by the conditional transition
probability matrix of its stochastic component. The evolution of µl , is governed by the exogenous
probabilities of find/loss a job, by the endogenous employment and search decisions, and by the
optimal decision to retire. The evolution of µa is determined by the optimal savings decision and
by the changes in the population.
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3.3 Calibration
To calibrate our model economy we do the following: First, we choose a calibration target country
—Spain in this article— and a calibration target year —2014 in this article. Then we choose the
initial conditions and the parameter values that allow our model economy to replicate as closely
as possible selected macroeconomic aggregates and ratios, distributional statistics, and the institu-
tional details of our chosen country in our target year. We describe these steps in the subsections
below.
3.3.1 Initialising the steady-state
In order to determine the steady-state, first we choose as an initial distribution of households µ0 =
µ2014; that is, we take µ jh at year 2014 directly from the Spanish Institute of Statistics (INE). The
initial distribution of households implies an initial value for the capital stock. This value is K2014 =
8.8025. The initial distribution of households and the initial survival probabilities determine the
initial value of unintentional bequests, E2014. Finally, we must also specify the initial values for the
productivity process, A2014. Since A2014 determines the units which we use to measure output and
does nothing else, we choose A2014 = 1.0.
3.3.2 Parameters
Once the initial conditions are specified, to characterize our model economy fully, we must choose
the values of a total of 40 parameters. Of these 40 parameters, 4 describe the household preferences,
3 describe the age profile of hours worked, 21 the process on the endowment of efficiency labor
units, 2 the production technology, 4 the pension system rules, and 6 the remaining components
of the government policy. To choose the values of these 40 parameters we need 40 equations or
calibration targets which we describe below.
3.3.3 Equations
To determine the values of the 40 parameters that identify our model economy, we do the fol-
lowing. First, we determine the values of a group of 21 parameters directly using equations that
involve either one parameter only, or one parameter and our guesses for (K,L). To determine the
values of the remaining 19 parameters we construct a system of 19 non-linear equations. Most
of these equations require that various statistics in our model economy replicate the values of the
corresponding Spanish statistics in 2014. We describe the determination of both sets of parameters
in the subsections below.
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3.3.3.1 Parameters determined solving single equations
The life-cycle profile of earnings. We measure the deterministic component of the process on the
endowment of efficiency labor units independently of the rest of the model. We estimate the values
of the parameters of the three quadratic functions that we describe in Expression (3.29), using the
age and educational distributions of hourly wages reported by the Instituto Nacional de Estadís-
tica (INE) in the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (2010) for Spain.4 This procedure allows us to
identify the values of 9 parameters directly.
ε jh = ξ1h +ξ2h j−ξ3h j2 (3.29)
Age profile of hours worked. To characterize the age profile of full-time hours, we use data from
the Encuesta de Empleo del Tiempo 2010 provided by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics
(INE). We impute hours supplied to the market as a fraction of the total time endowment and
we assume that the time endowment is 14 hours a day, 7 days a week. We then parameterize the
average allocated time to market activities per age with the help of quadratic curves. That is, we
estimate e j as:
e j = a1 +a2 j−a3 j2 (3.30)
Full hours worked rise initially and then they level off. Starting in the 50s, hours decline slightly.
This procedure allows us to identify the values of 3 parameters directly.
The pension system. In 2014 in Spain, the payroll tax rate paid by households was 28.3 percent and
it was levied only on the first 50,358 euros of annual gross labor income. Since we omit the tax
cap, we impose that all gross earnings pay pension contributions. We also impose that payroll tax
collections are used to finance both pension payments and unemployment benefits. This implies
that the payroll tax rate in our model economy is 0.2954.
Our choice for the number of years used to compute the retirement pensions in our benchmark
model economy is Nb = 17. This is because in 2014 the Spanish Régimen General de la Seguri-
dad Social took into account the last 17 years of contributions prior to retirement to compute the
pension. Finally, our choice for the first retirement age is R0 = 61.
Government policy. To specify the government policy, we must choose the values of government
consumption, Gt , of the tax rate on capital income, τk, of the tax rate on income, τy, and of the tax
rate on consumption, τc.
Preferences. Of the three parameters in the utility function, we choose the value of only σ directly.
Specifically, we choose σ = 2.0.
Technology. According to the Spanish National Institute of Statistics data (INE), the capital income
share in Spanish GDP was 0.4702 in 2014. Consequently, we choose θ = 0.4702.
4 Since we only have data until age 64, we estimate the quadratic functions for workers in the 20–64 age cohort and we project
the resulting functions from age 65 onwards.
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Adding up. So far we have determined the values of 21 parameters either directly or as functions
of our guesses for (K,L) only. We report their values in Table 3.1.
3.3.3.2 Parameters determined solving a system of equations
We still have to determine the values of 19 parameters. To find the values of those 19 parameters we
need 19 equations. Of those equations, 14 require that model economy statistics replicate the value
of the corresponding statistics for the Spanish economy in 2014, 4 are normalization conditions,
and the last one is the government budget constraint that allows us to determine the value of Tr/Y ∗
residually.
Aggregate Targets. According to the BBVA database, in 2014 the value of the Spanish capital stock
was 3,194,730 million euros.5 According to the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) in 2014
the Spanish Gross Domestic Product at market prices was 1,037,250 million euros. Dividing these
two numbers, we obtain K/Y = 3.08, which is our target value for the model economy capital to
output ratio.
According to the INE, Private Consumption plus indirect taxes was 586,080 million euros in 2014
(see Díaz-Giménez and Díaz-Saavedra (2017) for an explanation). That same year, pension pay-
ments were 114,410 million euros and unemployment benefits ammounted 24,570 million euros.
Consequently, the ratios of these variables to GDP at market prices are 56.4, 11.1, and 2.4 percent.
Finally, and according to the Encuesta de Población Activa (INE), in Spain in 2014 there were
36,804,100 people aged 20+ years old. That same survey reports that 17,264,850 were workers
and 5,436,500 were unemployed. Consequently, these numbers imply that the share of workers
was 46.9 percent and the share of unemployed were 14.8 percent.
Distributional Targets. We target the 3 Gini indexes and 5 points of the Lorenz curves of the Span-
ish distributions of earnings, income and wealth. We have taken these statistics from the Spanish
National Institute of Statistics (INE), the OECD, and Budría and Díaz-Giménez (2006), and we
report them in bold face in Table 3.3. Castañeda et al. (2003) argue in favor of this calibration pro-
cedure to replicate the inequality reported in the data. These targets give us a total of 8 additional
equations.
Normalization conditions. In our model economy there are 4 normalization conditions. The tran-
sition probability matrix on the stochastic component of the endowment of efficiency labor units
process is a Markov matrix and therefore its rows must add up to one. This gives us three normal-
ization conditions. We also normalize the first realization of this process to be z(1)=1.
The Government Budget. Finally, the government budget is an additional equation that allows us
to obtain residually the government transfers to output ratio, Tr/Y ∗.
The Parameters. The 14 parameters determined by the system are the following:
5 This number can be found at htt p : //www. f bbva.es/T LFU/microsites/stock09/ f bbva_stock08_index.html.
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• Preferences: β , α , and γ .
• Technology: δ .
• Stochastic process for labor productivity: z(2),z(3),z11,z12,z21,z22,z32, and z33.
• Pension system: φ .
• Fiscal policy: b0.
3.3.3.3 Methodology
To solve this system of equations we use a standard non-linear equation solver. Specifically, we use
a modification of Powell’s hybrid method, implemented in subroutine DNSQ from the SLATEC
package.
The DNSQ routine works as follows
1. Choose the weights that define the loss function that has to be minimized
2. Choose a vector of initial values for the 14 unknown parameters
3. Solve the model economy
4. Update the vector of parameters
5. Iterate until no further improvements of the loss function can be found.
Table 3.4 provides the parameter values of our calibration and of their accuracy.
3.4 Comparing economies with different public insurance systems
In this section, we compare economies that differ in terms of the public insurance systems that are
available to households. Our baseline economy, described above, features an unemployment insur-
ance (UI) system and a pension system for retirees, as in Spain. We compare this economy to an
economy where there is only the pay-as-you-go pension system but no unemployment insurance;
one in which in addition to the pension system, there is a backpack system (but no UI); and finally
one in which all the three systems are available (denoted BP Economy). The backpack system
introduced is parametrized with a contribution rate of τb = 2.0% of labor earnings, as described
in Section 3.2.4. The description of household’s problem changes slightly, with the backpack bt
becoming a relevant state variable. With the law of motion of the backpack described in 3.2.4, it
is straightforward to extended the optimization problem presented in 3.2.5 to account for the new
state variable.
The introduction of the backpack system affects individual decisions and aggregate variables.
There are several direct effects of the backpack system at the individual level. The backpack is a
substitute for private insurance, and discourages savings. It helps to smooth consumption after a
job loss, when jobless individuals can withdraw from their backpack; and it affects the allocation
of consumption over the life-cycle, since workers can use the accumulated backpack savings to
finance consumption after retirement.
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Since we assume that there are no annuity markets in the economy, households leave accidental
bequests when they die. Such bequests are wasted at the individual level, therefore an increase
in private savings or in backpack savings generates additional bequests.6 In addition, since the
backpack system is financed with taxation of labor income, it affects the labor supply decision. It
allows to reduce individual tax payments, since both backpack assets and private assets are subject
to capital taxation, backpack income is not subject to household income taxation whereas capital
income is. Shifting savings from private capital holdings into the backpack account allows for a
reduction in tax payments. Finally, at the retirement age, the value of the accumulated backpack
assets affects the retirement decision. The worker faces the tradeoff between leaving the labor force
and collecting the retirement pension and cashing out backpack savings, or prolonging the career
and continuing accumulating backpack savings while working.
The resolution of these individual tradeoffs affect aggregate outcomes. The introduction of the
backpack influences aggregate investment and the capital stock in the economy, depending on the
offsetting effects on private savings and accumulation of backpack assets. It affects aggregate labor
supply, depending on the impact of taxes and labor supply incentives through the employment-
linked savings technology. By distorting the allocation of capital and labor, it affects aggregate
output and consumption, that may increase or decrease if there is under- or over-accumulation of
capital in the economy. As a consequence, the equilibrium market prices of capital and labor may
change, again influencing savings and labor supply decision of households. The introduction of
different policies and the corresponding household and market forces also impact the government
budget constraint. Longer retirement periods and higher average wages increases pension pay-
ments and hence social security taxes on workers. Higher unemployment and wages also increase
taxes, necessary to finance unemployment benefit expenditures. More production, consumption,
and private investment enlarge the tax base and, for a given level of government expenditures,
imply lower tax rates. These changes in government policy further influence households decisions
and welfare, and are accounted for in the results presented below.
When comparing the different scenarios, there are a few policy parameters that we change and
others we intentionally keep fixed. Specifically, we fix the level of all tax rates except for the payroll
tax, that adjusts across economies to clear the social security budget (payroll tax collections finance
unemployment benefits and pensions). We also fix the level of the individual lump sum transfer.
Therefore, given that all other tax rates are fixed, changes in total tax revenue are thrown into or
fished from the sea (in the form of wasteful government consumption). In the next subsection,
we evaluate social welfare across the different economies by calculating the implied consumption
equivalent variation (CEV) in the expected lifetime utility of individuals entering the economy at
age 20, relative to the benchmark model that is calibrated to the Spanish economy in 2014. We
calculate the welfare changes for specific groups in the population, depending on education, labor
market productivity, and labor market status. After we introduce the backpack system in the model,
we further dissect the welfare consequences by isolating the more important channels discussed
above.
6 This is in contrast with the tax-transfer pension system that directly transfers resources from young workers to old retirees
hence helps avoid accidental bequests.
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3.4.1 Unemployment Insurance and Backpack System
Compared with the baseline economy, replacing the existing unemployment benefit system with a
backpack system (BP) with a contribution rate of 2% has a large impact in the economy. House-
holds enter the economy without backpack claims. Absent an unemployment insurance policy,
young households need to privately insure the risk of loosing a job early in life. Aggregate savings
increase substantially, more than 20% relative to the baseline economy. The return on capital goes
down from 5.3% in the baseline to 3.9% in the economy with no unemployment insurance. Rela-
tive to total output, this increase in precautionary savings raises investment 3.7% and the share of
output allocated to private consumption goes down by more than 2%.
Table 3.5: Aggregates and output ratios in the baseline economy and in the economy without UI
but with BP system (Only BP).
Values Y Ratios∗
Baseline Only BP %∆ Baseline Only BP ∆ p.p.a
Y 2.3565 2.5763 9.32 100.00 100.00 0.00
K 8.7809 10.8108 23.11 3.72 4.19 0.47
L 0.7311 0.7200 –1.52 31.02 27.94 –3.08
H 0.2115 0.2086 –1.38 8.97 8.09 –0.88
C 1.0690 1.1124 4.05 45.36 43.17 –2.19
G 0.5182 0.5295 2.18 21.99 20.55 –1.45
I 0.7693 0.9344 21.46 32.54 36.26 3.72
Only BP is the alternative economy without UI but with BP system. Y : output, K: capital stock, L:
labor in efficiency units, H hours of labor supply, C: aggregate private consumption plus consumption
tax collections, G: government consumption, I: investment. The ratio K/Y measured in model units
and not in percentage terms.
a : Difference in percentage points.
∗ : As a share of output at factor cost.
The over-accumulation of capital in the economy is unproductive and costly in terms of social
welfare, as Table 3.6b below shows. Low productivity workers are hurt the most. Nevertheless,
this capital over-accumulation effect is even stronger if the unemployment system is eliminated
and there is no ‘backpack’ to replace it, as Table 3.6a below shows.
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Table 3.6: Consumption Equivalent Variation (%) in average lifetime utility relative to the baseline
economy, in an alternative scenario:
(a) Without Unemployment Insurance.
Education Labor Productivity
Low Medium High
Dropouts -18.73 -11.54 -6.76
High School -20.23 -12.41 -6.58
College -24.91 -17.04 -10.12
(b) With only a Backpack System.
Education Labor Productivity
Low Medium High
Dropouts -18.42 -11.20 -6.30
High School -19.96 -12.05 -6.10
College -24.62 -16.71 -9.54
3.4.2 Pension System and Backpack System
In contrast to the previous results, adding the backpack system in the baseline economy (that fea-
tures unemployment insurance and the pay-as-you-go pension system) implies significant positive
welfare gains for all demographic groups. As described above, the introduction of the backpack
account affects individual decisions, aggregate quantities and prices. Households partially substi-
tute private savings by saving through the backpack system. While private asset holdings go down,
the backpack savings that are added to the supply of capital in the economy imply that, at the new
equilibrium, the aggregate capital stock is 3.56% larger. Hours worked slightly decrease, but high
productivity workers work more, such that the aggregate effective labor increases. This implies
that the level of output increases by 2%. In the baseline economy, capital is productive at the mar-
gin and the interest rate is relatively high. Hence the backpack system, by slightly increasing the
capital stock, improves the allocation of resources in the economy. A larger capital stock decreases
the interest rate to 5.1% and makes labor more productive at the margin, therefore the wage rate
increases slightly more than 1%. Aggregate consumption increases by 1.21%. Relative to output,
aggregate consumption declines slightly (less than half a percentage point).
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Table 3.7: Aggregates and output ratios in the baseline economy and in the economy with the BP
system (BP Economy).
Values Y Ratios∗
Baseline BP Economy %∆ Baseline BP Economy ∆ p.p.a
Y 2.3565 2.4035 1.99 100.00 100.00 0.00
K 8.7809 9.0942 3.56 3.72 3.78 0.06
L 0.7311 0.7355 0.60 31.02 30.60 –0.42
H 0.2115 0.2113 –0.10 8.97 8.79 –0.17
C 1.0690 1.0820 1.21 45.36 45.02 –0.34
G 0.5182 0.5179 –0.06 21.99 21.54 –0.55
I 0.7693 0.8036 4.45 32.54 33.43 0.89
The BP Economy is the alternative economy with BP system. Y : output, K: capital stock, L: labor
in efficiency units, H hours of labor supply, C: aggregate private consumption plus consumption tax
collections, G: government consumption, I: investment. The ratio K/Y measured in model units and
not in percentage terms.
a : Difference in percentage points.
∗ : As a share of output at factor cost.
At older ages unemployment declines, bringing additional utility from leisure, and the share
of retired households declines. Workers move to the pension system later by delaying retirement
(albeit some of them are inactive) and consuming out of the accumulated backpack savings.
The breakdown of the welfare gains across education and productivity types is presented in
Table 3.8.
Table 3.8: Consumption Equivalent Variation (%) in average lifetime utility in the economy with
a backpack system (BP), relative to the baseline economy.
Education Labor Productivity
Low Medium High
Dropouts 1.59 1.36 1.29
High School 1.52 1.40 1.56
College 1.44 1.48 1.41
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Table 3.9: Labor Market Shares (% of population).
W U I R
Spaina 46.9 14.8 14.2 24.1
Baseline 54.1 14.9 5.7 25.2
Only BP 53.6 14.3 7.0 25.1
BP Economy 54.3 14.7 6.3 24.7
aSpanish data is from 2014, retired households include those collecting other pensions than retirement
pensions (disability pensions, widowhood pensions, etc.) W : workers, U : unemployed, I: inactive, R:
retirees. All shares correspond to people aged 20+.
The fact that there are relatively less unemployed and retired households in the backpack econ-
omy implies a smaller burden on the social security budget. Accordingly, payroll taxes decline
which, together with the income tax exemption on backpack asset income, eases the distortionary
effects of taxation relative to the baseline economy. Table 3.10 shows the decline in the payroll tax
τp, and the decline in capital income tax collection. Nevertheless, total tax revenues are slightly
higher in the BP Economy (0.89 vs. 0.87). Note that the government budget constraint is satisfied
in both economies, with the increase in tax collection being compensated by higher government
expenditures.
Table 3.10: Policy Parameters and tax revenue ratios in the baseline economy and in the economy
with the BP system (BP Economy).
Tax Rates Tax Revenues Revenue Y Ratios (%)∗
Baseline BP Economy %∆ Baseline BP Economy %∆ Baseline BP Economy ∆ p.pa
τc 0.2320 0.2320 0.00 0.2480 0.2511 1.25 10.52 10.44 –0.08
τy 0.1213 0.1213 0.00 0.2018 0.1987 –1.54 8.56 8.26 –0.30
τk 0.1111 0.1111 0.00 0.0521 0.0519 –0.39 2.21 2.15 –0.06
τp 0.2965 0.2942 –0.78 0.3684 0.3658 –0.71 15.63 15.21 –0.42
τb – 0.0200 – – 0.0253 – – 1.06 –
τc: consumption tax rate, τy: household income tax rate, τk: capital income tax rate, τp: payroll tax, τb:
backpack contribution tax.
a : Difference in percentage points.
∗ : As a share of output at factor cost.
Regarding inequality, moving from 1.1 to 1.3 increases wealth inequality since low earners
(those who receive the stochastic productivity shock 1) reduce their holdings of liquid assets pro-
portionately more than those medium and high earners. Specifically, the Gini of Wealth increases
from 0.6663 to 0.6795 (see Table 3.3). Nevertheless, that there is no significant variation in earn-
ings inequality, or in that of pensions. Consequently, income inequality slightly increases from
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0.3582 to 0.3588. In sum, there is an overall welfare improvement with a moderate increase in
inequality.
Table 3.11: The Distributions of Earnings, Income, and Wealth∗
Bottom Quintiles Top
Gini 10 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 10
The Earnings Distributions (%)
Spain 0.35 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
Baseline 0.39 3.2 7.7 10.8 13.0 20.5 48.1 31.9
BP Economy 0.39 3.2 7.7 10.8 12.9 20.4 48.1 32.1
The Income Distributions (%)
Spain 0.35 2.1 6.3 12.1 17.2 23.7 40.7 25.0
Baseline 0.36 2.9 6.9 12.0 15.4 21.6 43.9 29.0
BP Economy 0.36 2.9 6.9 11.9 15.5 21.8 43.9 29.2
The Wealth Distributions (%)
Spain 0.57 0.0 0.9 6.6 12.5 20.6 59.5 42.5
Baseline 0.66 0.0 0.3 3.0 7.5 20.1 69.0 46.1
BP Economy 0.68 0.0 0.3 2.7 7.0 20.0 69.9 46.8
∗The source for the Spanish data of earnings and income are the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE)
and the OECD. The source for the Spanish data of wealth is the 2004 Encuesta Financiera de las Familias
Españolas as reported in Budría and Díaz-Giménez (2006). The model economy statistics correspond to
2014.
3.4.2.1 Welfare Decomposition
As explained above, the introduction of the backpack system affects households directly by influ-
encing their consumption-savings and labor market decisions, and also indirectly through changes
in prices and taxes. We decompose the total effect presented in Table 3.8 by conducting the fol-
lowing exercise.
First, starting from the baseline economy, we solve for the (partial equilibrium) steady state
with a backpack policy in place with a 2% contribution rate, and with the backpack income taxed
the same way as private savings. In addition, we fix the factor prices at the baseline level, and the
payroll tax is also fixed at the baseline. We compare lifetime utility for different groups in this
economy with the corresponding values of the baseline economy. The difference, expressed in per-
centage change of consumption equivalent units, is shown in 3.12a. We then solve for the steady
state in which the payroll tax adjusts, such that the decrease in pension payments and unemploy-
ment benefit expenditures is compensated with a decrease in τp. The additional welfare gains of
this decrease in taxes are in 3.12b. In the BP economy, backpack income is not subject to household
income tax. 3.12c shows the impact of this tax exemption, positive for all demographic groups. Fi-
nally, the increase in capital and labor supply affects the equilibrium capital-labor ratio and hence
prices. As explained above, in the baseline economy the return on capital is relatively high. When
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these prices adjust, high productivity households suffer with a lower return on their savings, and
low productivity workers enjoy an upgrade in their labor income with increasing wages. The effect
of prices in shown in 3.12d. Adding up all the contributions, we obtain the total welfare effect of
the introduction of the backpack system, presented in Table 3.8.
Table 3.12: Decomposition of welfare effects of the backpack system.
(a) With the BP, fixed prices, taxing backpack income, fixing all
taxes at the Baseline.
Education Labor Productivity
Low Medium High
Dropouts 0.81 0.80 1.11
High School 0.78 0.83 1.35
College 0.77 0.92 1.12
(b) Lower payroll tax.
Education Labor Productivity
Low Medium High
Dropouts +0.25 +0.25 +0.27
High School +0.25 +0.25 +0.27
College +0.26 +0.26 +0.26
(c) Backpack income tax exemption.
Education Labor Productivity
Low Medium High
Dropouts +0.17 +0.19 +0.24
High School +0.16 +0.17 +0.21




Dropouts +0.36 +0.12 –0.33
High School +0.33 +0.15 –0.27
College +0.29 +0.18 –0.08
We also measure the consumption equivalent variation in welfare for different labor market
groups, when comparing the baseline economy with the backpack economy. We calculate the gain
in lifetime utility for employed, unemployed and inactive agents from the perspective of age 20. For
retirees, we compute the CEV of the change in the remaining lifetime value at the first retirement
age. The breakdown is presented in Table 3.13 for workers, discriminating across the different
productivity levels, and for the other groups in Table 3.14.
Table 3.13: Consumption Equivalent Variation (%) in the economy with a backpack system (BP),
relative to the baseline economy: workers.
Education Labor Productivity
Low Medium High
Dropouts 1.59 1.36 1.29
High School 1.52 1.40 1.56
College 1.44 1.48 1.41
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Table 3.14: Consumption Equivalent Variation (%) in the economy with a backpack system (BP),
relative to the baseline economy: unemployed, inactive and retirees.
Labor Status Education
Dropouts High School College
Unemployed 1.34 1.31 1.25
Inactive 1.46 1.45 1.44
Retirees 0.92 1.13 1.82
3.4.3 Expanding the Backpack System
After studying the implications of a backpack system with a small (2%) contribution tax, we began
to solve for the allocative and welfare effects of larger systems. As part of our next steps, we
will investigate what is the best system for the calibrated Spanish economy, taking into account
how the backpack system interacts with the other two insurance policies in the baseline economy:
unemployment insurance and pay-as-you-go pension system. As a first step, we set as the backpack
contribution rate, τb, the share of the payroll tax that implicitly finances unemployment insurance
expenditures in the baseline economy. This implies τb = 4.57%. The resulting economy (denoted
BP 2) is described in the tables below.
Table 3.15: Aggregates and output ratios in the baseline economy and in the economy with the BP
system with τb = 4.57% (BP 2).
Values Y Ratios∗
Baseline BP 2 %∆ Baseline BP 2 ∆ p.p.a
Y 2.3565 2.4376 3.44 100.00 100.00 0.00
K 8.7809 9.2553 5.40 3.72 3.79 0.07
L 0.7311 0.7433 1.66 31.02 30.49 –0.52
H 0.2115 0.2122 0.33 8.97 8.70 –0.29
C 1.0690 1.0955 2.47 45.36 44.94 –0.42
G 0.5182 0.5156 –0.51 21.99 21.15 –0.84
I 0.7693 0.8268 7.47 32.54 33.91 1.37
The ratio K/Y measured in model units and not in percentage terms.
a : Difference in percentage points.
∗ : As a share of output at factor cost.
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Table 3.16: Policy Parameters and Ratios (Baseline and BP 2)
Tax Rates Tax Revenues Revenue Ratios (%)∗
Baseline BP 2 %∆ Baseline BP 2 %∆ Baseline BP 2 ∆ p.pa
τc 0.2320 0.2320 0.00 0.2480 0.2542 2.50 10.52 10.42 –0.10
τy 0.1213 0.1213 0.00 0.2018 0.1939 –3.92 8.56 7.95 –0.61
τk 0.1111 0.1111 0.00 0.0521 0.0524 0.57 2.21 2.15 –0.06
τp 0.2965 0.3049 2.83 0.3684 0.3741 1.54 15.63 15.34 –0.29
τb – 0.0457 – – 0.0589 – – 2.41 –
a : Difference in percentage points.
∗ : As a share of output at factor cost.
Note that the larger backpack system increases the capital stock by more than 5%. As a percent-
age of output, investment increases 1.37% and consumption actually falls. The increase in wages
raise the cost of pensions and payroll taxes have to increase. In addition to the introduction of the
backpack tax, this has a negative effect on labor supply. These results suggest that "forced savings"
dimension of the backpack system may become too large close to τb = 4.57%, which is something
we will investigate in future work.
Nevertheless, the aggregate level of consumption in the expanded backpack economy increases,
bringing additional welfare improvements for all demographic groups and for more than 95% of
the households, when compared to the status quo.
Table 3.17: Consumption Equivalent Variation (Baseline and BP 2, Newborns, %)
Education Labor Productivity
Low Medium High
Dropouts 1.78 1.57 1.37
High School 1.74 1.65 1.78
College 1.47 1.66 1.60
3.4.3.1 Voting
In all the results discussed above, we compared different steady states. For each steady state, we
described changes in utility from the perspective of a newborn, who is about to enter the economy
at age 20. However, the policy changes may have different impacts for households of different ages.
We therefore count all the agents who are better off in the reformed economy, relative to the base-
line, according to the distribution µ j,h,z,l,a. As we saw above, replacing the current unemployment
insurance policy with a small backpack system as large negative consequences: over-accumulation
of capital and reduction in households’ consumption out of total output, and corresponding reduc-
tion in welfare among the different demographic groups. If we ask each household in the economy
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if they prefer that scenario to the baseline economy, only 25% households do so. In contrast, as
we saw, the backpack economy improves the allocation of capital and labor, and increases con-
sumption for households. More than 92% of households backpack economy with τb = 2%. If we
increase the contribution rate to τb = 4.57%, the fraction of households who prefer the backpack
economy to the baseline increases to 96%.
3.5 Conclusions
We have shown that there can be important allocative and welfare gains in introducing a ‘back-
pack’ , system in an economy with a pay-as-you-go pension system and unemployment insurance
with unlimited benefits. The main mechanism behind these gains is the partial substitution of pri-
vate savings by backpack savings, while total savings and capital increase; as a result, the economy
interest rate decreases while wages increase. Associated with this change there is a better alloca-
tion of employment, with a lower share of unemployed and retirees and a higher percentage of high
productive agents within the employed. Effectively, there is a more efficient allocation of savings
in the economy, with a shift from pure transfers – to the unemployed and retirees – to savings
and, therefore, investment in productive capital. Nevertheless, unemployed are better off by the
better prospects that the economy offers and retirees are better, since in our economy pension ben-
efits are linked to productivity, which is higher in the ‘backpack economy’. Similarly, while the
price changes – higher wages and lower interest rates – unambiguously benefit low and medium
productivity workers, high productivity workers are hurt by the lower return on their savings; nev-
ertheless, the positive effect of lower payroll taxes and a better employment allocation (e.g. later
retirement age) results in an overall benefit from the reform.
It is quite a remarkable result that, in our economy with a very detailed heterogeneous agent
structure, if all the agents from age 20 to 100 are asked if they prefer the current public savings
system or one with a relatively small ‘backpack,’ more than 90% choose the latter. Further robust-
ness checks are needed, but, in any case, all these effects and results would not had been possible
to capture without a calibrated exercise such as the one that we have carried out.
Our results also suggest new ones. Within the current single-country analysis: from further
improving our calibration and performing further robustness checks, to sharpen the potential gains
of an introduction of a ‘backpack’ since, as we have seen, a ‘bigger backpack’ , can be better, but
we have not solved which one would be the best for our Spanish benchmark economy, keeping
the existing pay-as-you-go and (improved) unemployment benefit systems, nor have we explored
yet the partial substitution of the existing pension system by an even bigger ‘backpack’. But, as it
has been done in Ábrahám et al. (2018), we can extend our analysis to other European economies,
In fact, as we have mentioned in the introduction, employment (retirement) funds, such as TIAA-
CREF, have played, and play, a major role in improving labor mobility (e.g. across US universities).
An European backpack can be a great complement to existing public savings systems, not only by
the effects shown here at the national level but, possibly even more importantly, by improving
labor mobility across the European Union.
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Capital share θ 0.4702
Public Pension System
Number of years of contributions Nb 17
First retirement age R0 61
Parameters determined by guesses for (K,L)
Public Pension System
Payroll Tax Rate τp 0.2954
Government Policy
Government consumption G 0.5181
Capital income tax rate τk 0.1116
Consumption tax rate τc 0.2330
Income tax Rate τy 0.1214
Table 3.2: Macroeconomic Aggregates and Ratios in 2014 (%)
C/Y ∗a P/Y ∗ U/Y ∗b K/Y ∗c W d Ie
Spain 56.4 11.1 2.4 3.08 46.9 14.6
aVariable Y ∗ denotes GDP at market prices.
bThe ratio U/Y ∗ is the Unemployment benefits as a share of Output at market prices.
cThe target for K/Y ∗ is in model units and not in percentage terms.
dVariable W is the share of workers in the Spanish population with 20+ years old.
eVariable I is the share of inactive in the Spanish population with 20+ years old.
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Table 3.3: The Distributions of Earnings, Income, and Wealth∗
Bottom Quintiles Top
Gini 10 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 10
The Earnings Distributions (%)
Spain 0.35 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
The Income Distributions (%)
Spain 0.35 2.1 6.3 12.1 17.2 23.7 40.7 25.0
The Wealth Distributions (%)
Spain 0.57 0.0 0.9 6.6 12.5 20.6 59.5 42.5
∗The source for the Spanish data of earnings and income are the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE)
and the OECD. The source for the Spanish data of wealth is the 2004 Encuesta Financiera de las Familias
Españolas as reported in Budría and Díaz-Giménez (2006).
Table 3.4: Initial Values, Final Values, Weights, and Errors.
Parameter Initial Value Final Value Statistic Weight (%) Target Result Error (%)
β 0.9750 1.0010 K/Y ∗ 300 3.08 3.38 9.74
α 0.7412 0.7799 W (%) 500 46.90 54.11 15.37
γ 0.4412 0.6999 I (%) 300 14.59 5.72 –60.80
δ 0.0760 0.0730 (C+Tc)/Y ∗ (%) 300 56.41 50.42 –10.62
φ 0.7570 0.8800 P/Y ∗ (%) 200 11.12 11.89 6.92
b0 0.1529 0.2300 U/Y ∗ (%) 200 2.41 2.18 –9.55
z(2) 1.5082 2.3491 GY 700 0.35 0.39 11.42
z(3) 5.6303 5.6877 GE 800 0.35 0.36 2.85
z11 0.9990 0.9918 2QY (%) 500 12.10 12.0 –0.83
z12 0.0005 0.0081 4QW (%) 1 20.60 20.11 -2.38
z21 0.0007 0.0275 1QW (%) 1 0.90 0.32 –64.45
z22 0.9992 0.9724 5QY (%) 5 40.70 43.90 7.86
z32 0.0001 0.0000 1QY (%) 5 6.30 6.90 9.52
z33 0.9991 0.9999 GW 700 0.57 0.66 15.78

Chapter 4
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Lucas’ Asset
Pricing Model when Utility is Unbounded
This chapter was written with Fabian Schuetze.
Abstract This note presents a proof of the existence of a unique equilibrium in a Lucas (1978)
economy when the utility function displays constant relative risk aversion and log dividends fol-
low a normally distributed autoregressive process of order one with positive autocorrelation. We
provide restrictions on the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the discount factor and the condi-
tional variance of the consumption process that ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium.
4.1 Introduction
We prove the existence of a unique equilibrium in a Lucas (1978) economy when the utility func-
tion displays constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and log dividends follow a normally dis-
tributed AR(1) process with positive auto-correlation. The equilibrium in the economy is charac-
terized by a pricing function for the Lucas tree and a value function for the representative consumer.
Under the assumption of a bounded utility function, Lucas proves the existence of a unique equi-
librium by showing that the pricing and value functions are fixed points of functional equations.
Lucas resorts to the sufficient conditions of Blackwell (1965) to document that Banach’s fixed
point theorem (e.g. p. 176 of Ok (2007)) guarantees the existence of a unique solution to each of
the functional equations. Alas, Blackwell’s conditions do not hold when the utility function dis-
plays the CRRA property. The conditions require utility being bounded in the sup-norm, which
does not hold when the consumption space is equal to the positive real numbers and the investor
displays CRRA preferences. Fortunately, Blackwell’s conditions are only sufficient. We exploit
the extension of Blackwell’s conditions by Boyd (1990) and document under which circumstances
Banach’s theorem can be applied. In particular, we provide a joint restriction on the coefficient of
relative risk aversion, the discount factor and the conditional variance of the consumption process
under which an equilibrium in the economy exists and is unique.
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Our solution method serves the same purpose as the local contraction methods (see Martins-
da Rocha and Vailakis (2010), Matkowski and Nowak (2011) and the references therein), which
provide conditions under which a functional equation has a unique solution in an unbounded set-
ting. In short, local contraction arguments rewrite the domain of the elements of the functional
space under consideration as a countable union of always increasing compact subsets. A function
is then said to be bounded if it is bounded in every such subset of its domain. Local bounded-
ness is implied by restrictions on the co-domain of the transition function for the state variable. In
non-stochastic problems, the strictest version of such restrictions is simply to require tomorrow’s
state to be an element of the same subset of the state space as today’s state variable. For stochas-
tic problems, Matkowski and Nowak (2011) write the state space as a sequence of increasing (in
the sense of inclusion) subspaces. The probability distribution that characterizes the transition of
the state is such that with probability one tomorrow’s state lies in the strictly larger but smallest
subspace relative to the smallest subspace that includes today’s state. These assumptions about
how the state traverses imply that if today’s value function is locally bounded, tomorrow’s value
function is locally bounded too. In our application, the state traverses according to a log-normal
distribution. This probability distribution has an unbounded support, precluding the application of
the argument outlined above.
This note is a complement to Kamihigashi (1998), who provides sufficient conditions for
uniqueness of equilibrium prices in a Lucas (1978) economy, presuming existence of the equi-
librium. He shows that utility functions which are discontinuous and unbounded below can lead
to non-uniqueness of asset prices, and that a transversality condition is not sufficient to guarantee
uniqueness. The sufficient conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium in Kamihigashi (1998) are in
the form of a bound on the growth rate of marginal utility when consumption goes to zero and to
infinity, independently of the process governing dividends. CRRA utility functions satisfy such a
bound on the growth rate of marginal utility and hence the equilibrium is unique. In contrast, we
formulate the optimization problem recursively as in Lucas (1978). We show that, for a particular
endowment process, an equilibrium exists and is unique: the value of the problem and the asset
pricing function are uniquely defined, and a transversality condition on the value function holds.
Alvarez and Stokey (1998) analyses dynamic programming problems with homogeneous return
functions and transition functions that are homogeneous of degree one. Using similar arguments
as theirs, we consider an optimization problem with a transition function that is not homogeneous
of degree one.
The structure of this note is as follows: In the next Section, we provide a brief description of
the economy and a definition of equilibrium in the asset pricing problem. Section 3 presents the
main result of the note and discusses an extension to Blackwell’s sufficient conditions for a given
operator on a metric space to be a contraction that is useful in our argument. We prove the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium and study properties of the pricing function in Section 4. Section
5 concludes.
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4.2 The economy and definition of equilibrium
We describe the equilibrium as in Lucas (1978). Let us denote next period’s share holdings by
x′ ∈ X, with X = [x, x̄], 0 < x < 1 < x̄, and current consumption by c ∈ R+. Let y ∈ Y = R++
be the current dividend of a Lucas-tree. The transition equation for next period’s dividend is
G(y,z′) = yαz′ with α ∈ (0,1) and logz′ ∼ N(0,σ2), σ > 0. Let Q be the probability density
over z′. Instantaneous utility is given by u(c) = c1−γ/(1− γ), with γ > 0; β ∈ (0,1) is a discount
factor. We use the following equilibrium definition:
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a continuous function p(y) : Y→ R+ and a continuous function


























where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on the initial period information, which is the
initial endowment y0 ∈ Y and asset holdings x0 ∈ X.
4.3 Sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique equilibrium
The following proposition is the crux of our note:









)1−γ Q(dz′)]< 1. (4.2)






)1−γ Q(dz′)+0.5]< 1. (4.3)
Finally, suppose that log(β )+(1− γ)2σ2/2 < 0. Then there exists a unique equilibrium. That is:
(1) There exists a unique non-negative continuous pricing function p(y),
(2) There exists a unique function v(y,x),
in accordance with Definition 1.
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The inequalities (4.2) and (4.3) will be described at the end of this section. Given a value function v,
we first study the existence of a unique pricing function. We begin by deriving a variant of an Euler
equation following Lucas (1978), given by (4.4) below. Let us assume that for each y, v(y,x) is an
increasing, concave and differentiable function with respect to x. Defining f (y) = p(y)∂u(y)/∂y
and using the equilibrium conditions x = x′ = 1 and c = y allows formulating the stochastic Euler
equation as:

















Lucas uses Blackwell’s sufficient conditions to show that the operator T , defined such that (4.4) is
equivalent to T f = f , is a contraction and then applies Banach’s fixed point theorem. To employ
Blackwell’s conditions, Lucas assumes that the utility function u and thereby the function h is
bounded with the sup-norm. With CRRA utility and a dividend process in R++, the function h is
unbounded with the sup-norm. Importantly, boundedness is a characteristic that is closely linked
to the employed metric. In the following subsection we study a norm with respect to which the
function h in (4.4) is bounded.
4.3.1 A weighted norm approach
Boyd (1990) extends Blackwell’s sufficient conditions by generalizing the metric from a sup-
norm to a weighted sup-norm. We denote the set of continuous functions f : Y → R+ by S,
and take ϕ ∈ S with ϕ > 0. Then f is ϕ-bounded with respect to the weighted sup-norm
|| f ||ϕ = supy∈Y {| f (y)|/ϕ(y)} if ∃ B ∈ R+ such that || f ||ϕ < B. Let Sϕ ⊂ S be the set of con-
tinuous and ϕ-bounded functions. Let us define the metric dϕ( f ,g) := || f −g||ϕ on Sϕ . Note that
(Sϕ ,dϕ) is a complete metric space (see e.g. Theorem 12.2.8 in Stachurski (2009)). We have the
following lemma, which is a corollary to the Weighted Contraction Mapping Theorem in Boyd
(1990):
Lemma 1 (Boyd’s sufficient conditions) Let T : Sϕ → S and suppose:
1. (monotonicity) T is monotone, that is ∀ f ,g ∈ Sϕ , f ≥ g implies T f ≥ T g;
2. (discounting) For any A ∈ R++, there exists θ ∈ (0,1) such that: T ( f +Aϕ)≤ T f +θAϕ;
3. (self-map) T (0) ∈ Sϕ .
Then T is a contraction in (Sϕ ,dϕ) with modulus θ .
The discounting and self-map property of operator T involve the weighting function explicitly.
The self-map property requires the function h to be bounded with a weighted sup-norm: ||h||ϕ < B
for some B ∈ R+. To develop some intuition about our proposal for such a ϕ , we consider the
functional form of h(y) = κyα(1−γ), where κ is a positive constant given by β ,γ and σ . For a given
α ∈ (0,1), if γ < 1, h is a strictly increasing and concave function; alternatively, if γ > 1, h is
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strictly decreasing and convex. Any positive continuous function ϕ which is weakly above h in Y
is a weighting function that makes h ϕ-bounded. One such function is given by:





When γ ∈ (0,1), the function above is equal to κ while 0 < y≤ 1 and then grows strictly above h
for all y > 1. When γ > 1, the weighting function in (4.5) is above h while 0 < y < 1 and stays at
κ when y≥ 1.






< 1,∀y ∈ Y. (4.6)
Similarly to the discussion of dynamic programming techniques with homogeneous return func-
tions in Alvarez and Stokey (1998), inequality (4.6) places a bound on the expected growth rate
of the weighting function. If ϕ was a constant function, (4.6) would be trivially satisfied (since
β < 1). However, as discussed above, in order to bound h the weight ϕ has to be above h, that
decreases or increases with y depending on γ . This observation motivates using another weighting
function arbitrarily close to and greater than h: relative to the weight in (4.5), such a weighting
function increases the range of parameters β ,γ,σ that satisfy condition (4.6). Instead, for the sake
of simplicity, we proceed with our analysis using (4.5) and illustrate the restriction on the parame-
ter space imposed by (4.6). To that end, take γ ∈ (0,1). To evaluate (4.6), for a given y∈Y, consider
realizations of z′ in the interval (0,y−α). Since in this interval G(y,z′) = yαz′ < 1, ϕ(G(y,z′)) = 1.
Conversely, for z′ ∈ [y−α ,∞), ϕ(G(y,z′)) = G(y,z′)1−γ . The following lines place an upper bound
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In the numerator, after the first equality sign, we split the support of z′ in two intervals to consider
the two branches in (4.5) separately. The inequalities in the second line hold as 1 > yα(1−γ) for
0 < y < 1 and yα(1−γ) ≥ 1 for y ≥ 1. The inequality in the third line follows since yα(1−γ) < y1−γ
for y > 1. Finally, the last inequality holds because the term in square brackets is the greatest at
y = 1. Accordingly, inequality (4.2) of Proposition 1 guarantees that, if γ < 1, Boyd’s discounting
property is satisfied. A similar arguments holds for values γ > 1, when inequality (4.3) holds. As
an illustration, the shaded region in Figure 4.1 documents which parameter pairs (σ ,γ) satisfy
conditions (4.2) and (4.3), when β is 0.99. When γ = 1, u(c) = log(c) and a solution to (4.4) can
be calculated analytically. A lower value of β enlarges the admissible region. In the following, the
Fig. 4.1: Illustration of the set of (γ,σ) values satisfying the conditions in Proposition 1. The grey
regions represent the combinations of (γ,σ) satisfying inequalities 4.2 and 4.3 in Proposition 1.
The region above (respectively below) the blue line corresponds to parameter combinations that
satisfy the additional restriction in Proposition 1, when γ < 1 (resp. γ > 1). β is 0.99.
proof of Part (1) of Proposition 1 will be completed.
4.4 Proof of the Proposition
In this section we formally prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the economy
described in Section 2. Following Proposition 1,we proceed in two steps. We first solve for a
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unique pricing function, p, taking as given a value function v (part (1) in Proposition 1). Then,
taking p as given, we complete the proof by showing that there is a unique value function v (part
(2)), in accordance with Definition 1.
Proof. (Part (1) of Proposition 1.) The proof begins by showing that T is a map from Sϕ to S.
Take some f ∈ Sϕ . As both h and the integral over f are continuous, T f is continuous.1 Hence
T : Sϕ → S. The operator T is monotone since for any f ,g ∈ Sϕ with f ≥ g,
∫
f (G(y,z′))Q(dz′)≥∫
g(G(y,z′))Q(dz′), so T f ≥ T g and 1 of Lemma 1 holds. Under assumption (4.2), condition 2 of
Lemma 1 is satisfied for 0 < γ < 1, as the argument in section 4.3.1 shows. It remains to be shown



































































The reasoning for each condition is analogous to the one made for the case 0 < γ < 1. Under (4.3),
condition 2 in Lemma 1 holds for γ > 1. The third condition of Lemma 1 requires h to be bounded
with the weighted sup-norm. Hence, since:















T (0) ∈ Sϕ and point 3 of Lemma 1 holds. Note that, under Lemma 1, the operator T is a self-
map (maps the space Sϕ into itself).2 Concluding, since T is a contraction over (Sϕ ,dϕ), Banach’s
fixed point theorem guarantees that a unique function f ∈ Sϕ satisfying (4.4) exists. The solution
is non-negative and continuous. Therefore the pricing function p(y) = f (y)/u′(y) is non-negative
and continuous as well.
1 Here is a sketch of the proof for continuity: Take any sequence yn → y and define the difference |T (yn)− T (y)| =
|h(yn)− h(y) + β
∫
( f (G(yn,z′))− f (G(y,z′)))Q(dz′)|. Successive application of the triangle inequality shows that the dif-
ference converges to zero as n increases.
2 See proof in p.6, Section 3, in Boyd (1990).
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After having shown that there exists a unique pricing function p given v, the converse remains
to be shown. The following argument completes the proof of Proposition 1.










The weighting function, now denoted by φ , can be defined similarly as:
φ(y,x) = κ ·max{1,y1−γ}. (4.8)
Let us assume that the function p is as in part (1) of Proposition 1, and p ∈ Sφ .3 To prove that a
unique fixed point H exists, one can resort to Lemma 1 to show that H is a contraction and then
use Banach’s theorem to establish existence and uniqueness of the fix point. We begin by showing
H : Sφ → S. For any v ∈ Sφ and u continuous, u(c)+β
∫
Z v(G(y,z
′),x)Q(dz′) is continuous. Since
for each (y,x) the budget correspondence is compact valued and continuous, Berge’s theorem
(Theorem 3.6 in Stokey and Lucas (1989)) guarantees that Hv is continuous. Hence H : Sφ → S.
Monotonicity of H holds. Discounting of H can then be established as in the proof of part (1) of
Proposition 1, above. Finally one needs to show that H has the self-map property. In mathematical
terms, H(0) ∈ Sφ if there is some B ∈ R+ such that:
sup
(y,x)∈Y×X




To show that (4.9) holds we consider two cases: γ ∈ (0,1) and γ > 1. For any γ ∈ (0,1) condition















Now we note that, by definition, p(y) = f (y)yγ and as shown in Part (1) of the proof, for all








≤ (κ +1)1−γ < B (4.11)
holds for some B ∈ R+, which proves that (4.9) holds for all γ ∈ (0,1). The proof for the comple-
mentary case γ > 1 follows directly from (4.9) and for brevity we omit the argument.4 Concluding,
we showed that H is a contraction and Banach’s fixed point theorem establishes that it has a unique
solution.
3 Sφ is defined as Sϕ , with ϕ replaced by φ .
4 In the case γ > 1 the assumption x≥ x with x > 0 is needed to show that H has the self-map property.
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At this stage, a characterization of function f that solves (4.4) is in order. The following lemma
documents some of its properties:
Lemma 2 Take f ∈ Sϕ such that T f = f . Then:
1. For any f0 ∈ Sϕ , ||T n f0− f ||ϕ → 0 as n→ ∞;
2. Suppose 0 < γ < 1. Then, both h and f are strictly increasing and concave. Suppose otherwise
1 < γ . Then both h and f are strictly decreasing and convex.
Proof. Point 1 of Lemma 2 follows directly from the fact that T is a contraction on a complete
metric space and hence, for brevity, will not be proved here. Point 2 is proved in the Appendix of
this note.
Properties of v assumed in Section 4.3 can be shown by arguments similar to Lucas (1978) (see
propositions 1 and 2). The proof that the fixed point v of the operator H satisfies the limit condition
in Proposition (1) is in Appendix B. This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
4.5 Conclusion
We present a proof of the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in a pure exchange economy of
Lucas (1978), when the utility function takes the CRRA form and the dividend stream follows an
autoregressive process of order one with positive autocorrelation. An interesting extension of the
argument presented in this note, that we leave for future research, is to consider the case in which
innovations affect the growth rate of dividends instead of the level.
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Appendix
4.6 Proof of Part 2 of Lemma 2
Proof. (Part 2 of Lemma 2) As in the main text, denote by Sϕ the set of continuous and ϕ-bounded
functions. The set S′ϕ is the set of continuous, ϕ-bounded, non-decreasing and concave functions,
and S′′ϕ ⊂ S′ϕ imposes additionally strict monotonicity and concavity. We want to show that the
contraction operator T maps any function f̃ ∈ S′ϕ into the subset S′′ϕ . As the solution to the func-
tional equation is characterized by T f = f and S′ϕ is a closed set, if the operator T transforms
any non-decreasing and concave function into a strictly increasing and concave function, then f is
strictly increasing and concave (Corollary 1 of the Contraction Mapping Theorem in Stokey and
Lucas (1989), p.52). To show the desired result, we suppose first that h is strictly increasing and
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concave and pick any f̃ ∈ S′ϕ . To begin, let us study whether T f̃ is strictly increasing. For any pair
ŷ,y ∈ Y with ŷ > y, the function T f̃ satisfies:








= T f̃ (y).
The inequality holds because G and h are strictly increasing and f̃ is non-decreasing. Hence, T f̃ is
strictly increasing. To analyse concavity, define yω = ωy+(1−ω)y′, for any y,y′ ∈ Y , y 6= y′, and
0 < ω < 1. The strict concavity form of h and G, together with f̃ being concave, ensure that:


















= ωT f̃ (y)+(1−ω)T f̃ (y′).
The function T f̃ is strictly concave. Taken together, we know that for any f̃ ∈ S′ϕ , T f̃ ∈ S′′ϕ .
Hence, f (such that T f = f ) must be an element of the set S′′ϕ , guaranteeing that f has the same
functional form as h. Now, suppose h is convex and falling. We could again define the operator
T as T f (y) = h(y) + β
∫
Z f (G(y,z
′))Q(dz′) and study into which subset a candidate solution is
mapped into. To facilitate analysis though, take a different route. Look at the modified operator
T f− = h−+ β
∫
Z f−(G(y,z
′))Q(z′), with h− = −h and f− = − f . Under the same assumptions
guaranteeing a unique solution to the original contraction mapping, there exists a unique solution
to the modified contraction mapping. As h− is strictly increasing and concave, the proof above
applies to the modified contraction mapping. As f− is strictly increasing and concave, f is strictly
decreasing and convex and inherits the properties of h.
4.7 Limit condition on v
Let us take v ∈ Sφ sucht that Hv = v, with the operator H as defined in Section 4.4 of the main
text. Our initial aim is to characterise lower and upper bounds on v in the functional space Sφ . We
will now argue that when v≥ 0 (respectively≤ 0), v can be bounded below (resp. above) using the
zero function and above (resp. below) using function φ (respec. −φ ). To this end, we consider any




f ∈ Sφ : f ≥ 0
}
. This is a closed subset of Sφ (its complement in
Sφ is open). We pick any f ∈ S′φ . Since the utility function u takes on positive values, H f ≥ 0 Thus,




. Then by Corollary 1 of the CMT (p.52) in Stokey and Lucas
(1989) v∈ S′
φ
, i.e. v≥ 0. A similar argument shows that for any γ > 1, v≤ 0. The remainder of this
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section shows that the discounted expected vale of the upper bound converges to zero, implying
that limt→∞E0 [β tv(xt ,yt)] = 0. We consider any γ ∈ (0,1) (For γ > 1, the condition is equivalent,











































The first line follows from the fact that v ∈ Sφ . The second line uses the definition of φ and the law
of iterated expectations. The third line bounds the the term in brackets. The strategy is identical to
the one used in the proof of Proposition 1. The fourth lines iterates until time zero and uses the
fact that α ∈ (0,1). The fifth line factors β t in. The entire sums converges to zero with t → ∞ if
log(β )+(1− γ)2σ2/2 < 0. The proof for γ > 1 is analogous.
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